Missed Signals, Missed Steps: New Revelations From the October 7 Probe
In the coming days, the Chief of Staff is slated to receive a revised version of the internal review that replaced the disqualified Operations Division probe. This updated assessment zeroes in on a series of nighttime discussions and how the conclusions drawn in those hours shaped—or failed to shape—the army’s posture when the onslaught of October 7 erupted.
Channel 12 News reports that senior commanders were operating in a haze of conflicting information, with uncertainty gripping the upper ranks during the very hours when clarity mattered most. The investigation describes a leadership trying to piece together fragments of data while missing the broader picture forming right in front of them.
One of the key moments highlighted occurred around 3:00 a.m., when Maj.-Gen. Yaron Finkelman led a “situation assessment” call with Brig.-Gen. Avi Rosenfeld and Shin Bet representatives. Roughly thirty minutes later, at 3:30, Finkelman laid out for top officials three concrete warning signs—among them the risk of a “surprise-initiated operation with an emphasis on a raid.” Despite this, the central instruction was to elevate readiness discreetly. “No tank movements, no scrambling of aircraft,” was the guiding principle, meant to avoid provoking the enemy. Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi accepted this framework as the night wore on.
The probe also recounts a series of response options that Finkelman raised but that ultimately never materialized. These included monitoring high-ranking Hamas operatives to enable a preemptive strike, launching UAV surveillance, and repositioning attack helicopters to Ramon Airbase—a move that was reversed soon after. The directive to the Air Force to bolster the alert posture of the air-defense system and to add an Iron Dome battery similarly went unexecuted. When dawn broke, the air-defense network crumbled almost immediately under the initial wave of fire.
Two additional high-level consultations took place later that night, this time initiated by the Chief of Staff himself and involving Maj.-Gen. Oded Basyuk alongside Finkelman. Halevi repeatedly returned to the concern of a subterranean assault and demanded urgent checks of the border barrier for any indication of tunnel penetration. The investigation notes that even after the attack had already begun, Halevi’s first inquiry to the division commander concerned a suspected tunnel—though Hamas made no use of tunnels in the attack.
Other fronts saw similar breakdowns. Despite Halevi’s push to heighten caution against a maritime strike, all seven Hamas vessels managed to breach the naval barrier. And although officials believed an aerial assault to be unlikely, drones and UAVs quickly disabled IDF surveillance systems, while terrorists flew motorized gliders across the border and fanned out into Israeli territory.
At 4:30 a.m., just hours before the catastrophic assault unfolded, the Operations Directorate issued another summary of directives. In it, Basyuk reiterated earlier instructions and added that certain readiness steps were “not relevant in the coming hours in terms of availability,” stressing the need to safeguard sensitive intelligence assets. In reality, the document marked yet another moment when warnings were acknowledged but not operationalized. The hours that followed proved just how devastating that inaction would be.
{Matzav.com}
