The Flydubai co-pilot accused of attempting to carry out a mass-casualty terrorist attack aboard a Tel Aviv-bound passenger jet had reportedly flown to Israel on multiple occasions before the attack — and investigators are now examining whether those earlier trips helped him prepare for what Israeli reports say was a premeditated plan to crash an aircraft at Ben Gurion Airport.
Hamam al-Hammami, the 29-year-old Omani national accused of attacking Captain Smit Machchhar aboard Flydubai Flight FZ1073 on September 30, allegedly sought employment specifically with airlines that operated flights to Israel and used earlier flights to familiarize himself with the route, according to Israeli reports citing information emerging from the investigation.
Channel 13 reported that al-Hammami told investigators that his interest in flying for an airline serving Israel predated his employment with Flydubai.
“I searched and checked which airlines fly to Tel Aviv and therefore I chose Flydubai. I tried to be hired by all the companies. I planned the attack before I was hired,” he reportedly told investigators.
Israeli reports have since gone further, saying investigators believe al-Hammami’s ultimate intention was to continue toward Israel while maintaining the appearance of an ordinary commercial flight and then crash the aircraft into Ben Gurion Airport during the final stages of its arrival.
That reported plan has transformed the significance of al-Hammami’s previous flights to Israel. If the account emerging from the investigation is accurate, his repeated arrivals at Ben Gurion may have provided him with firsthand familiarity with the route and the ordinary operational sequence of an Israel-bound commercial flight.
But there is an important distinction between familiarity with Ben Gurion Airport and access to secret Israeli security information.
Commercial pilots do not need to conduct clandestine reconnaissance to learn a great deal about flying into Ben Gurion. Much of the information necessary to operate a commercial aircraft into Israel is deliberately published and distributed to airlines and flight crews as part of the international aviation system.
Israel’s Civil Aviation Authority provides pilots with information governing Israeli airspace, airports, flight procedures and emergency requirements. Airlines and crews also receive operational information concerning Ben Gurion’s hours, capacity, runway and airport restrictions, arrival and departure procedures and the process for obtaining permission to operate flights.
Knowing the normal approach to Ben Gurion, therefore, is not evidence by itself that a pilot was gathering intelligence. A commercial pilot is supposed to know how to fly into the airport.
Repeated flights, however, provide something that an aviation chart cannot: experience.
A pilot who routinely operates a particular route becomes familiar with how the journey unfolds in practice — the transition into Israeli-controlled airspace, communications with air-traffic controllers, approach instructions, runway assignments under different conditions, movement after landing, arrival at the assigned gate and the ground procedures preceding the aircraft’s next departure.
All of that is ordinary professional knowledge for an airline pilot. None of it necessarily involves obtaining classified information.
But if a pilot already intends to use an aircraft as a weapon, investigators are examining whether otherwise routine knowledge could acquire a very different significance. Someone who has repeatedly flown the route would know from experience what an uneventful arrival looks and sounds like and how the sequence normally progresses as the aircraft gets closer to its destination.
The emerging allegations about al-Hammami’s intended target make that question particularly significant. Israeli media reported that he planned to maintain the appearance of a normal flight for as long as possible before crashing into Ben Gurion Airport. Reports said this was one reason he allegedly waited until the aircraft had reached Jordanian airspace before launching his attack on the captain.
According to another report, if he determined that reaching Israel was impossible, al-Hammami had considered crashing the aircraft into a U.S. military installation in Jordan instead. These reported details remain allegations emerging from the investigation and have not all been independently confirmed by Emirati authorities.
There is currently no public evidence that al-Hammami obtained classified information about Ben Gurion’s security apparatus during his previous visits.
A foreign pilot does not, merely by landing at Ben Gurion, receive information about Israeli intelligence capabilities, classified security deployments, emergency counterterrorism procedures or undisclosed vulnerabilities surrounding the airport.
Nor are foreign crews simply permitted to wander unrestricted through sensitive sections of the airport. Their movements and aircraft handling are governed by airport procedures, with foreign carriers required to use authorized ground-service providers and follow established security and operational rules.
The term “reconnaissance,” therefore, requires some caution. The publicly known evidence establishes that al-Hammami could have accumulated considerable operational familiarity with the route and airport through repeated flights. Whether he deliberately collected additional information about Israeli security is a separate question that investigators have yet to answer publicly.
The larger scandal may ultimately involve something else entirely: Israel knew who was sitting in the cockpit.
Before Flight FZ1073 departed Dubai, the United Arab Emirates transmitted the passenger and crew manifest to Israel, including the names and nationalities of those aboard. Regional officials said Israeli authorities raised no objection to any member of the crew before the flight departed.
Such advance transmission is routine. Israel operates an interactive Advance Passenger Information system designed to receive passenger and crew information from international carriers before flights reach the country. The system allows crew lists to be transmitted and updated before departure.
That means al-Hammami’s identity and nationality were not details discovered only after he allegedly picked up a crash axe inside the cockpit. His information had been transmitted before the aircraft took off.
The question now roiling Israel’s security establishment is what happened — or failed to happen — after that information arrived.
The Shin Bet has said responsibility for checking manifests from foreign airlines lies with the Transportation Ministry. Transportation Ministry officials have responded that the ministry is not an intelligence agency and does not possess the capability to conduct intelligence investigations into every foreign pilot and passenger.
The ministry maintains that foreign airlines are responsible for properly vetting their crews and complying with Israeli restrictions, while intelligence agencies possess the information and capabilities necessary to identify national-security threats.
International aviation rules similarly place substantial responsibility on an aircraft’s home country and airline. Commercial pilots undergo licensing procedures, background checks and medical and psychological evaluations, but implementation and enforcement differ between jurisdictions. Flydubai and its crews fall under the regulatory oversight of the United Arab Emirates.
That system becomes particularly problematic in al-Hammami’s case because information that might have changed the security assessment apparently existed elsewhere.
Reports indicate that Omani authorities had already become concerned about al-Hammami while he worked for Oman Air. He was reportedly monitored after accessing extremist material and was ultimately removed from flying duties and assigned to an office position because of concerns about his radical views.
He later left Oman Air and eventually joined Flydubai. Reports citing sources familiar with the matter say Flydubai did not consult the Omani government about his background before hiring him.
Al-Hammami subsequently found himself flying commercial aircraft to Israel — despite being an Omani national and despite Oman having no diplomatic relations with Israel.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said longstanding Israeli arrangements with foreign airlines were intended to prevent nationals of countries without diplomatic relations with Israel from operating such flights. He said the Flydubai case apparently exposed a “loophole” in that system.
Reports have raised the possibility that al-Hammami possessed dual citizenship or another status that may have enabled him to avoid the nationality restriction. His father is reportedly Omani and his mother Syrian, although Oman has not publicly provided a complete account of his citizenship status.
The result was an extraordinary disconnect: according to the reports now being examined, Oman possessed information raising concerns about al-Hammami’s extremist views; Flydubai hired him and assigned him to Israel-bound flights; Israel received his name and nationality before his flights; and none of those pieces produced an intervention before September 30.
The security failures appear even more troubling because the problem of screening foreign airline crews had already been discussed within the Israeli government well before the Flydubai attack.
Israeli officials had debated for years which agency should bear responsibility for foreign aviation security. Previous reviews reportedly warned about gaps in the system, while two committees recommended creating a dedicated national authority responsible for civil aviation security.
A 2021 government decision shifted additional responsibilities toward the Transportation Ministry. By 2023, officials from the National Security Council, Shin Bet, Mossad and Transportation Ministry were discussing how foreign crews should be evaluated and how intelligence relevant to their backgrounds could be incorporated into the screening process.
A confidential State Comptroller report in 2024 reportedly identified additional weaknesses, and the National Security Council warned in 2025 that portions of the government’s aviation-security decisions had still not been properly implemented.
The problem was not theoretical. Reports indicate that nationals of countries including Iran, Lebanon, Pakistan and Oman had previously arrived at Ben Gurion as members of foreign airline crews, despite the obvious security sensitivities involved.
The Transportation Ministry has insisted that Flydubai had been specifically instructed to perform background checks on its crews and comply with Israeli nationality restrictions. The airline had reportedly confirmed that those restrictions were incorporated into its crew-assignment system.
Yet al-Hammami continued flying the route.
The September 30 attack finally exposed the consequences of those gaps. According to UAE investigators, al-Hammami attacked Captain Machchhar inside the cockpit with an emergency crash axe and attempted to seize control of the Boeing 737 MAX as it flew toward Israel.
During the struggle, the aircraft plunged thousands of feet. Despite suffering serious injuries, Machchhar managed to open the cockpit door, allowing passengers and crew members to overpower al-Hammami. Reserve pilots aboard the flight then stabilized the aircraft and diverted it to Tabuk, Saudi Arabia.
The UAE Attorney General has formally described al-Hammami’s actions as an attempted “terrorist act,” while investigators continue examining his motive, digital devices, ideological background and any possible connections to extremist organizations.
The investigation has now spread beyond Israel, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Oman. Australian counterterrorism authorities are examining al-Hammami’s years in Melbourne, where he studied at RMIT University approximately a decade ago. Reports have alleged that during his time in Australia he visited radical mosques and extremist websites.
Social-media material associated with al-Hammami has also become part of the investigation. One video reportedly showed Israeli aircraft viewed from cockpits before concluding with an image of Ayman al-Zawahiri, the Al Qaeda leader killed in a U.S. drone strike in 2022.
Other material referred to Humam al-Balawi, the Jordanian doctor who became an Al Qaeda suicide bomber and killed seven CIA personnel and a Jordanian intelligence officer in Afghanistan in 2009.
Those discoveries may provide evidence of al-Hammami’s ideological interests, but investigators have not publicly established that Al Qaeda, Iran or another organization directed the attack. UAE authorities have said they are continuing to investigate possible connections while examining physical and digital evidence.
Israel has already begun tightening the system. Following the attack, Netanyahu ordered National Security Council Director Shmuel Ben Ezra to appoint an inspector to conduct a comprehensive review of security arrangements governing foreign civilian aviation to Israel.
Israel is also moving toward expanded screening of foreign pilots and tighter restrictions on crew members holding citizenship — including dual citizenship — from countries that do not maintain diplomatic relations with Israel.
The Prime Minister’s Office has indicated that Israel intends to know precisely who is flying every aircraft entering the country and to conduct an additional Israeli security assessment rather than relying entirely on the airline or foreign government that licensed the pilot.
The central question surrounding al-Hammami’s earlier visits to Ben Gurion therefore has two very different parts.
What could he have learned? Through repeated flights, he could have become thoroughly familiar with the normal operational experience of approaching, landing and operating at Ben Gurion — much of it based on information available to any properly authorized commercial pilot and reinforced through firsthand experience.
There is currently no public basis for concluding that those visits gave him classified knowledge of Israeli security systems, intelligence capabilities or secret vulnerabilities at the airport. If investigators discover evidence that he deliberately gathered such information, that would represent a significant new development.
But the second question may prove harder for Israeli authorities to explain: How did a pilot who had reportedly already attracted security concerns elsewhere, whose nationality and identity were transmitted to Israel before his flights, and who may have specifically sought employment that would allow him to fly to Tel Aviv, repeatedly make it into the cockpit of commercial aircraft headed for Ben Gurion Airport?
{Matzav.com}