Israeli Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu was provided with intelligence assessments as far back as 2018 outlining Hamas’s detailed plans for a large-scale invasion of southern Israel, according to a report published Tuesday based on classified documents and testimony from senior officials.
The Ynet news outlet reported that between 2018 and 2022, Hamas formulated an extensive operational strategy for a coordinated, multi-front assault targeting Israeli military installations and civilian communities near Gaza. The blueprint, later compiled into a file referred to as “Jericho’s Walls,” envisioned breaching the border fence at numerous locations and sending thousands of armed operatives into Israeli territory.
That strategy ultimately materialized on October 7, 2023, when Hamas launched a brutal cross-border attack that left approximately 1,200 people dead, resulted in the abduction of 251 hostages, and ignited a prolonged war in Gaza lasting two years.
According to Ynet, Netanyahu — who has held the premiership since 2009, aside from an 18-month interval in 2021-2022 — was shown intelligence connected to the “Jericho’s Walls” framework on multiple occasions over the years. This stands in contrast to his public statements after October 7 in which he denied having prior knowledge of such a plan.
The first documented instance cited in the report dates to April 2018. At that time, the Research Division of the Military Intelligence Directorate circulated a classified assessment to high-level officials. Recipients reportedly included the military secretaries to the prime minister and defense minister, the National Security Council, the chiefs of Shin Bet and Mossad, and the office of the IDF chief of staff.
One of the intelligence documents referenced by Ynet carried a subheading posing the question: “Is Hamas’s military wing building up its force for a broad attack deep into our territory?”
The 2018 assessment warned that Hamas was crafting “a plan for an initiated offensive maneuver with a broad order of [troops in] battle (six reserve battalions; approximately 3,000 fighters)” designed to overrun IDF positions while simultaneously striking civilian communities “in the border communities and deep inside Israel.”
The report underscored the gravity of the threat, stating that “the scope of the plan and its complexity are exceptional.” Although some intelligence analysts questioned whether Hamas possessed the immediate capacity to execute the entire operation, they cautioned that “the plan illustrates a new and broader threat scenario than before.”
The existence of the 2018 “Jericho’s Walls” document cited by Ynet was confirmed last year by the IDF in an internal Military Intelligence Directorate review examining the intelligence breakdown preceding October 7.
That internal review, which anticipated several elements later seen in the October 7 assault, cited the Hamas plan as declaring that “forces from five [elite] Nukhba companies should attack and destroy the posts belonging to the [IDF] Gaza Division… everything will be done above ground… with [rocket] fire… attack the kibbutzim in order to take hostages… focus on critical sites… livestream from the posts and kibbutzim.”
According to the military probe, what began as a conceptual idea within Hamas evolved over time into a formalized strategy and received official internal authorization in 2019.
Netanyahu has consistently rejected claims that he was warned of an impending large-scale Hamas attack in the years prior to October 7. In response to questions from State Comptroller Matanyahu Englman during a review of the failures surrounding the assault, the Prime Minister’s Office stated that “the prime minister never received and was never briefed on the ‘Jericho’s Walls’ document” before the war began, and that he was “never presented with any Hamas plan for a mass raid into Israeli territory.”
However, materials released by Netanyahu himself appear to complicate that position. In a 55-page document submitted to the State Comptroller last week and later made public, Netanyahu acknowledged that he had received the April 2018 intelligence assessment. In that submission, he quoted a restrained portion of the evaluation noting that Hamas had “a basic capability to carry out several simultaneous raids,” but that under existing conditions, “it is not likely at this time.”
The published version did not include the paragraph’s final sentence, which warned that the document reflected Hamas’s long-term intentions and its plans to significantly expand its military capabilities.
A former senior intelligence official cited by Ynet said Netanyahu’s duty “was to ensure there [was] no repetition of the Military Intelligence assessment on the eve of Yom Kippur 1973,” referencing the well-known intelligence misjudgments preceding the Egyptian-Syrian surprise attack that triggered the Yom Kippur War.
“Back then, intelligence said ‘low probability,’ and the political echelon simply accepted it as a binding assessment without asking questions or checking on its own,” the official added. “Any serious leader would say in this situation: You received the plan in 2018, and even if Hamas is currently far from operational capability, this must be taken into account.”
Ynet further reported that in 2018, Unit 8200 obtained an Arabic Hamas document laying out a sweeping assault plan. It called for “launching a comprehensive offensive operation against the Zionist entity with the aim of subduing the enemy,” including attacks on the Re’im base, numerous communities along the Gaza border, and more distant targets such as Ashdod, Ashkelon, and strategic infrastructure. The document specified that “the attack will be carried out by six battalions,” with the “main effort” occurring above ground.
The Shin Bet also reviewed the Hamas plan and drafted its own analysis, describing the document’s “unusual and troubling characteristics.” That assessment was distributed to several entities, including the National Security Council, which operates under the prime minister’s authority.
One source quoted by Ynet said the Shin Bet’s findings were transmitted directly to Netanyahu.
In May 2022, Military Intelligence obtained an additional version of the Hamas invasion blueprint, dated August 2021, which was incorporated into the “Jericho’s Walls” file. That iteration likewise described large numbers of Nukhba Force operatives breaching the Gaza Division’s defenses and advancing into cities in southern Israel.
The document was presented to senior IDF intelligence officials, who at the time judged the scenario to be implausible. During a November 2022 Southern Command meeting reviewing potential conflict scenarios in Gaza, the “Jericho’s Walls” plan appeared at the bottom of a list of assessments.
Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid were serving as prime ministers for most of 2022, including in May and November, while Netanyahu was then leader of the opposition.
In 2023, after Netanyahu returned to office, the Intelligence Directorate collected new intelligence regarding Hamas training exercises simulating a cross-border invasion in the months leading up to October 7. Some personnel within Unit 8200 concluded that Hamas’s invasion concept had evolved into an actionable and concrete plan.
According to the IDF’s internal investigations, these conclusions were conveyed through emails and meetings to intelligence officers at Southern Command and to regional 8200 officers stationed in southern Israel. However, the updated assessments did not reach senior decision-makers, including top intelligence leadership.
Although Netanyahu was not personally briefed on the 2022 and 2023 updates to the “Jericho’s Walls” file, a senior intelligence source told Ynet, “Even if the army commanders failed to [connect the dots] themselves, the obligation of the prime minister is to demand answers regarding Hamas’s intentions.” “Netanyahu did nothing,” the source said.
Despite documentary evidence indicating that Netanyahu was exposed to Hamas invasion planning as early as 2018, he has maintained that the “Jericho’s Walls” file refers only to the 2022 version presented during the year he was not in office. Critics argue that this interpretation is intended to distance him from responsibility for the failure to prevent the October 7 attack.
{Matzav.com}
