OCTOBER 7 FAILURES: Former IDF Chief Herzi Halevi Says Massacre Could Have Been Prevented, Admits Israeli Bombs Killed Hostages
Former IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi acknowledged Sunday that the October 7 Hamas massacre was preventable, conceded that Israeli airstrikes inadvertently killed hostages held in Gaza, and forcefully dismissed allegations that members of Israel’s security establishment had knowingly helped Hamas carry out the attack.
Speaking at a Shurat HaDin conference in New York, Halevi delivered an extensive assessment of the intelligence and military failures that preceded the massacre, describing how Israel misjudged Hamas’s intentions, underestimated the threat from Gaza, and failed to protect civilians when thousands of terrorists launched their assault.
Halevi addressed the issues at the third annual Rage Against the Hate conference, held at the Museum of Jewish Heritage in Manhattan. The gathering, organized by the Shurat HaDin legal organization, brought together security specialists, legal experts, academics, and representatives of organizations combating antisemitism.
One of Halevi’s strongest statements concerned allegations that the October 7 attack was made possible by deliberate betrayal within Israel’s military or intelligence services. He categorically rejected that accusation.
“There was absolutely no betrayal. The political echelon and the country’s leadership need to state this clearly and unequivocally.”
“I can explain exactly how October 7th unfolded, down to the smallest detail. I know these individuals, and I cannot believe that any of my colleagues-after decades of service during which they risked their own lives-would suddenly decide to assist Hamas.”
Halevi argued that any conspiracy involving Israeli security personnel would have required the participation of numerous individuals. He maintained that no evidence supporting such allegations had surfaced during the three years since the massacre.
Turning to the question of accountability, Halevi called for a comprehensive examination of the events leading up to October 7, saying Israel must confront the mistakes that allowed Hamas to launch its devastating attack.
“As part of the process of learning and healing, Israel must complete its investigation and ask difficult questions-just as we have done within the IDF. This is of great importance. October 7th was a failure that could have been prevented.”
He described the painful consequences of the military’s failure to reach Israeli civilians as terrorists invaded communities near the Gaza border.
“We must look failure in the eye in order to be able to fix things. I look at a photograph of Shiri Bibas and see the fear in her eyes. We were not there in time to help and save her. That is the failure.”
Halevi also discussed the intelligence assessments that shaped Israel’s approach to Gaza before the attack. According to the former military chief, the IDF, Shin Bet, and political leadership operated under the mistaken belief that Hamas was not seeking a major confrontation with Israel.
Instead, Israeli officials believed the terrorist organization was primarily interested in maintaining its control over Gaza while gradually extending its influence into Yehuda and Shomron.
Hamas, Halevi explained, deliberately encouraged that assessment while secretly preparing for a massive cross-border assault.
He acknowledged that Israel’s broader security strategy had also contributed to the failure, with military planners concentrating more heavily on threats from Iran and Hezbollah than on Hamas.
“We should have gone to war in Gaza, but our order of priorities was: first Iran, then Hezbollah, and only then Hamas-because we did not know that Hamas intended to carry out an operation of this scale.”
Describing the opening moments of the massacre, Halevi said Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar had planned an operation designed to achieve complete surprise through simultaneous attacks along the Gaza border.
Israeli military positions and civilian communities came under assault shortly after 6:29 a.m., overwhelming defenses that were unprepared for an attack of such magnitude.
Halevi said Sinwar had also calculated that Israel would be reluctant to launch a full-scale ground invasion of Gaza because of the operational difficulties involved. Israel’s previous reliance on limited military operations had helped reinforce that assumption.
As Israeli forces struggled to contain the attack, military leaders were also concerned that Hezbollah might open another front along the northern border.
Halevi recalled the message conveyed to the Lebanese terrorist organization later that morning.
“We were caught by surprise in Gaza, but we are watching you closely. Should you make even the slightest move, a devastating blow will fall upon Lebanon.”
The former chief of staff also revealed tensions between military commanders and Israel’s political leadership over the decision to send ground forces into Gaza.
“It took us a long time to convince the political echelon to conduct a ground maneuver in Gaza. We needed to break the pattern of small, limited rounds of conflict that relied solely on airstrikes.”
Addressing the hostage crisis, Halevi defended the military campaign as a crucial factor in securing the release of captives, rejecting arguments that the fighting had not contributed to their return.
“I know some people think otherwise, but without strong military pressure inside Gaza, we would not have been able to bring the hostages back. I can prove this.”
At the same time, he made a painful admission concerning hostages who were killed during Israeli military operations.
“Unfortunately, we made mistakes. Our own bombs killed hostages. Of course, this was not intentional; we did not know they were there.”
Halevi said the military subsequently improved its procedures for identifying where hostages were being held, seeking to reduce the danger of inadvertently harming captives during operations against Hamas.
The conference was chaired by Shurat HaDin president Nitsana Darshan-Leitner, who called for stronger international cooperation among legal professionals, diplomatic officials, researchers, and technology specialists in confronting antisemitism and campaigns against Israel.
“Our response must be an unprecedented collaboration among legal experts, diplomats, researchers, and technology professionals. It is time to shift from defense to offense, and to exact a heavy price from anyone who seeks to undermine our right to live securely in our own land.”
Halevi’s remarks come amid continuing demands from survivors and bereaved families for an independent state commission of inquiry into the October 7 failures. The issue has remained a major source of political controversy, with families demanding a comprehensive accounting of decisions made by both military commanders and government officials before and during the massacre.
Recent reporting has also renewed scrutiny of communications between Israel’s political and military leadership on the morning of the attack. According to reports published in September, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and Halevi did not speak directly until approximately 9:45 a.m., more than three hours after the Hamas assault began. The Prime Minister’s Office subsequently released a timeline of Netanyahu’s communications that morning.
{Matzav.com}
