THE “NEW SUICIDE BOMBERS”? Ex-IDF Intelligence Officer Warns Flydubai Attack Could Signal Terrifying New Threat From Radicalized Airline Pilots
The attempted downing of a Flydubai passenger jet bound for Israel has raised a frightening new question for aviation and counterterrorism officials: Could terrorist movements or hostile states seek to radicalize trained commercial pilots, effectively turning trusted members of airline crews into 9/11-style suicide attackers from inside the cockpit?
Miri Eisin, a former IDF colonel who spent more than two decades in military intelligence, warned that the September 30 attack aboard Flydubai Flight FZ1073 could represent a new type of aviation terrorism — one far more difficult to stop than the traditional hijacking model because the potential attacker is already authorized to fly the aircraft. Pasted markdown
“An individual doesn’t get the idea on his own to crash a plane full of people including himself. Somebody told him that if you do that you get your 72 virgins,” Eisin said.
“If you think back to past plane hijackings, including 9/11, the hijacker was never the pilot of the plane. . . . This could be a new kind of suicide bomber,” she said.
Eisin said her immediate suspicion following the Flydubai attack was that Iran or one of its proxies might have played a role, while stressing that she has no direct evidence tying Tehran to the incident and that the international investigation remains underway.
That distinction has become even more important as investigators have gathered additional information. Israeli sources familiar with the initial findings now say the evidence increasingly points toward accused co-pilot Hamam al-Hammami acting alone rather than as an operative dispatched by Iran or an organized terrorist group. Investigators have not publicly established an operational connection between al-Hammami and Iran, Hezbollah, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or Al Qaeda.
President Trump has also raised the possibility that Iran could have been involved in the attack, though he has not presented evidence establishing such a connection.
Eisin nevertheless said the concept behind the attack resembles methods she associates with Iran and its terrorist proxies — using radicalization and unconventional means to strike Israel or Israeli interests.
“This to me is very much something that could have come from Hezbollah or the IRGC Quds Force, this is the kind of things that they think of,” she said.
The suspect has been identified as al-Hammami, a 29-year-old Omani national who was serving as co-pilot aboard the Dubai-to-Tel Aviv flight. UAE authorities have formally described his actions as an attempted terrorist attack.
Al-Hammami allegedly attacked Indian captain Smit Machchhar inside the cockpit with the aircraft’s emergency crash axe, a piece of safety equipment normally stored inside the flight deck. The revelation that the weapon was already aboard the aircraft has shifted attention away from how he could have smuggled a weapon through airport security and toward the much harder problem of protecting an aircraft from one of the people entrusted to fly it.
During the violent struggle, the Boeing 737 MAX entered a steep descent, dropping thousands of feet while the badly wounded Machchhar fought to regain control and reach the cockpit door.
Despite serious injuries, Machchhar eventually managed to unlock the cockpit. Crew members and passengers then rushed in, subdued al-Hammami and restrained him while two other Flydubai pilots who were traveling aboard the aircraft took control and diverted the jet to Tabuk, Saudi Arabia.
Machchhar has since described believing that he was going to die during the attack but realizing that opening the cockpit door offered the only chance to save everyone aboard. His actions allowed those outside to enter the flight deck and overpower the attacker.
Saudi authorities detained al-Hammami following the emergency landing and later transferred him to the United Arab Emirates, where investigators have been reconstructing his background, digital history, employment record and possible contacts.
The investigation has uncovered indications that concerns about al-Hammami’s alleged extremist views existed well before the attack. Reports indicate that he had previously worked for Oman Air but was removed from flying duties after authorities became concerned about extremist material and possible radicalization.
Despite that history, he subsequently found work elsewhere in commercial aviation and ultimately joined Flydubai, raising urgent questions about whether information known in Oman was ever shared with other airlines or governments.
There is also a separate question about how an Omani citizen was assigned to a flight bound for Israel. Oman does not maintain diplomatic relations with Israel, and Israeli security procedures were supposed to prevent nationals of countries without diplomatic relations from serving aboard incoming flights unless specifically cleared.
Those failures have already prompted Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to order a comprehensive review of security procedures governing foreign civilian flights entering Israel, including how overseas airline crews are vetted and how information is exchanged among Israeli security agencies, foreign governments and airlines.
Netanyahu has said that al-Hammami had undergone “Islamic radicalization.”
Eisin said a pilot’s education, career and professional standing provide no guarantee against extremist indoctrination. The very assumption that a highly trained professional would be less susceptible to radicalization, she argued, could itself create a dangerous blind spot.
“Just because someone’s a pilot doesn’t mean they can’t be radicalized, people from all walks of life could be radicalized. [Syrian dictator] Bashar al-Assad was a doctor, Josef Mengele was a doctor,” she said.
“And if you kill Israelis, the whole world applauds you,” she added.
Oded Ailam, a former senior Mossad counterterrorism official and former deputy head of the agency’s global operations, agreed that the incident exposes a particularly difficult security vulnerability, although he has expressed greater skepticism that al-Hammami was formally recruited by a state or terrorist organization.
Ailam said turning an established commercial pilot into a suicide attacker would require a much more complicated recruitment and psychological process than convincing an inexperienced young terrorist to carry explosives into a civilian target.
“Recruiting and convincing a pilot to do something like that, it’s not the same as telling a 15-year-old to strap on a bomb and walk into a promenade and explode himself. This is a very sophisticated and long operation,” he said.
Ailam has said that, based on what is publicly known so far, he considers a lone-actor scenario more plausible. But he cautioned that a “lone wolf” does not necessarily develop extremist ideology in isolation.
“The lone wolf is influenced by the pack of wolves around him, he’s influenced by jihadists, by extremists in mosques, he’s influenced by prominent Iranians calling for death to Israel,” he said.
That possibility has become especially significant as investigators examine al-Hammami’s online activity. Social-media accounts associated with him contained extremist and anti-Israel material, and posts that appeared after the attack included imagery connected to senior Al Qaeda figures.
One video reportedly showed Israeli aircraft filmed from cockpits and concluded with an image of Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama bin Laden’s successor as leader of Al Qaeda. Material connected to Humam al-Balawi — the Jordanian doctor who became an Al Qaeda suicide bomber and killed seven CIA personnel and a Jordanian intelligence officer in Afghanistan in 2009 — also appeared in material linked to the accounts.
Those discoveries have intensified the investigation into al-Hammami’s ideological development. They have not, however, established that Al Qaeda recruited him, directed him or knew about his attack beforehand.
In fact, Al Qaeda supporters subsequently attempted to capitalize publicly on the Flydubai incident, praising the attacker and urging copycat attacks against American and Israeli aviation. That propaganda has heightened concerns that even if al-Hammami acted independently, his actions could provide a model for others already working within the aviation industry.
For Ailam, that possibility may ultimately present a more complicated threat than a conventional terrorist cell. Organized networks can potentially be penetrated, monitored and disrupted. An individual who becomes radicalized while continuing to function normally in a trusted professional position may leave far fewer warning signs.
“Terror combined with mental disturbances in the pilot, when you combine it together the outcome is horrific. There are a lot of people who are being radicalized who are airline pilots,” he said.
The attack has exposed a weakness built into much of the aviation-security architecture created after September 11. For the past quarter-century, enormous resources have been devoted to keeping unauthorized people out of cockpits. Reinforced cockpit doors, screening procedures and strict access rules are designed largely around the assumption that the threat comes from the passenger cabin.
The Flydubai attack inverted that assumption. The alleged attacker was already sitting behind the reinforced door, had legitimate access to the controls and could reach an emergency axe stored there for safety purposes.
Ailam has noted that pilots occupy a uniquely trusted position aboard an aircraft. Aviation systems cannot operate if every captain and co-pilot is treated as a potential terrorist, yet traditional passenger screening offers little protection when the person posing the threat is a credentialed flight crew member.
That dilemma is likely to become a central subject of aviation-security reviews following the incident. Authorities are examining whether more continuous background screening of pilots is needed, particularly when they fly sensitive international routes, and whether intelligence about extremist behavior must be shared more effectively across national borders.
Ailam has also called for greater international intelligence cooperation and continued monitoring capable of detecting sudden extremist associations or significant behavioral changes among people occupying highly sensitive aviation positions, while warning against indiscriminately treating pilots as suspects.
Another potential response could involve cockpit technology. Current security systems are heavily designed to prevent outsiders from opening the cockpit door, but the Flydubai incident raises the opposite problem: how other authorized crew members can regain access if someone inside the cockpit becomes the threat.
Ailam predicted that airlines and regulators will now have to examine technological systems capable of allowing trusted crew members to regain cockpit access during an emergency without undermining the reinforced-door protections introduced after 9/11.
“It’s impossible to screen every pilot, the answer will have to be technological,” he said.
{Matzav.com}
