Former Shin Bet director Ronen Bar has filed a 3 million shekel defamation lawsuit against Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, alleging that he repeatedly warned the government about the growing Hamas threat and recommended targeted assassinations of senior terrorist leaders in the months preceding the October 7, 2023, massacre, but that his proposals were never carried out.
The lawsuit, filed Wednesday, presents a detailed account of security discussions stretching back nearly a year before the Hamas attack. Bar maintains that he advocated a more aggressive policy toward Hamas, including operations against its senior leadership, while Netanyahu repeatedly emphasized the importance of avoiding a broader confrontation in Gaza.
Among the most significant allegations is Bar’s account of a security meeting held on October 1, 2023, just six days before the massacre. According to the former intelligence chief, Netanyahu authorized preparations for targeted strikes against Hamas commanders during that meeting, but no subsequent discussion was convened to advance the plans toward implementation.
Bar’s lawsuit follows public statements by Netanyahu assigning him substantial responsibility for the intelligence and security failures that allowed Hamas terrorists to invade southern Israel on October 7. The former Shin Bet director argues that the prime minister’s accusations misrepresent his conduct before the attack and damage his reputation.
The court filing also raises questions about Netanyahu’s approach to targeted assassinations, including an allegation that the prime minister expressed concern that expanding such operations could expose him personally to retaliatory attacks.
The claims are Bar’s account of events and have not been established as judicial findings. Netanyahu disputes Bar’s characterization of the security failures and maintains that the former intelligence chief failed to alert him during the critical hours before the Hamas invasion.
Early Warnings About Yahya Sinwar
According to the lawsuit, Bar had already recommended eliminating Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar well before Netanyahu returned to the prime minister’s office in late 2022.
During a November 7, 2022, meeting between the two men, Bar reportedly informed Netanyahu that the Shin Bet had developed an operational plan to assassinate Sinwar, who was then Hamas’s leader in the Gaza Strip.
Bar says he had recommended carrying out the operation earlier that year, but the proposal was never advanced.
The former Shin Bet director argued that Sinwar had developed a strategy of directing terrorist attacks in Yehudah and Shomron from Gaza while avoiding significant Israeli retaliation against Hamas inside the Strip.
According to Bar, the absence of a substantial military response allowed Hamas to operate with an increasing sense of immunity. He believed Israel needed to abandon that approach and impose a direct price on the organization’s leadership to restore deterrence.
On January 8, 2023, following another terrorist operation directed from Gaza into Yehudah and Shomron, Bar says he again recommended action against Hamas. That proposal, too, was not implemented, according to his lawsuit.
By April, Bar’s warnings had broadened beyond individual terrorist operations to encompass the overall deterioration of Israel’s security environment.
At an April 19 assessment, he warned that terrorist organizations were increasingly interpreting Israel’s internal political divisions and weakened deterrence as an opportunity to intensify attacks.
He recommended striking terrorist operatives who were directing attacks from Gaza, arguing that they had come to believe they could operate without facing serious consequences.
Netanyahu Allegedly Feared Personal Retaliation
A further confrontation over targeted assassinations allegedly occurred on May 21, 2023, following Israel’s military campaign against Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
During a meeting with Netanyahu, Bar reviewed the lessons of that operation and proposed significantly expanding Israel’s use of targeted killings, including beyond Islamic Jihad and into other terrorist organizations and operational arenas.
According to the lawsuit, Bar presented intelligence suggesting that Sinwar’s ideological outlook was becoming increasingly extreme and that Hamas was moving toward a more dangerous confrontation with Israel.
Bar argued that a precisely executed offensive operation at the beginning of a conflict could potentially shorten the fighting and reduce casualties by eliminating senior commanders before they could direct further attacks.
Netanyahu’s response, as described in the court filing, was to raise concerns about the possibility of personal retaliation against him if Israel broadened its assassination policy.
Bar’s allegation suggests that the discussion extended beyond the military consequences of targeting Hamas leaders to include the potential security risks facing the prime minister himself.
The lawsuit does not establish whether such concerns were the determining factor behind any particular operational decision.
An Unusual Warning Letter
The May discussion followed an earlier written warning that Bar says he delivered directly to Netanyahu on February 13, 2023.
In that letter, the Shin Bet chief reportedly warned that Israel was confronting a dangerous combination of declining deterrence, growing instability in the Palestinian arena, and deepening divisions within Israeli society.
Bar viewed the convergence of those developments as creating an increasingly favorable environment for Israel’s enemies.
According to the lawsuit, Netanyahu responded by emphasizing the Shin Bet’s responsibility for protecting elected officials, including the prime minister and members of his family.
The exchange is cited by Bar as part of his broader argument that the country’s security leadership had repeatedly been informed of the deteriorating situation long before October 7.
Warnings Intensified Before the Yomim Tovim
Bar maintains that the government’s approach toward Hamas remained largely unchanged throughout the summer of 2023, despite repeated assessments warning of a possible escalation.
On August 20, he presented a security assessment covering multiple fronts and warning of a heightened risk of confrontation during the approaching Tishrei Yomim Tovim.
The following day, Bar says he personally warned Netanyahu that terrorist activity directed from Gaza was becoming increasingly severe.
According to the lawsuit, Netanyahu acknowledged the need to address the Hamas command structure responsible for directing attacks from the Strip, but the proposed measures were not advanced.
At a September 12 security cabinet meeting, Bar delivered another assessment describing what he considered an unusually high number of attempted terrorist attacks against Israel.
He argued that Israel could no longer rely exclusively on defensive measures to intercept attacks and arrest operatives. Without offensive action against those organizing the terrorism, he warned, the underlying security situation would remain unchanged.
Netanyahu, according to Bar’s account, stressed the importance of getting through the approaching Yomim Tovim with as little security escalation as possible.
Nine days later, on September 21, the Shin Bet submitted a professional assessment to the prime minister outlining the possibility of a preemptive offensive operation.
The recommendation, however, called for implementing such an operation after the Yomim Tovim, reflecting the government’s stated preference to avoid provoking a confrontation during that period.
At another meeting on September 27, Netanyahu reportedly reiterated that he did not want a major escalation with Gaza and instructed security officials to use force in a measured manner.
The October 1 Meeting
The most consequential discussion described in Bar’s lawsuit took place on October 1, less than a week before Hamas launched its massive assault.
According to the filing, Bar told Netanyahu that terrorist activity being directed from Gaza had reached an exceptional level and warned that Israel could find itself drawn into a confrontation even before the Yomim Tovim concluded.
Bar recommended accelerating preparations for targeted operations against senior Hamas figures responsible for directing terrorist activity.
Netanyahu reportedly agreed that the preparations should move forward.
However, Bar claims that the prime minister’s authorization did not lead to a follow-up meeting or an operational decision to execute the proposed strikes.
The former Shin Bet director presents that failure to advance the plans as a central element of his argument that the government did not adequately respond to his repeated warnings.
Previous disclosures concerning pre-October 7 security discussions have indicated that the Shin Bet also sought to revive plans for a simultaneous operation against Sinwar and Mohammed Deif, Hamas’s senior military commander.
The proposed strategy reportedly envisioned eliminating the two leaders and subsequently striking additional members of the terrorist organization’s command structure.
At the same time, records released by Netanyahu’s office have included instructions to improve operational readiness for targeted assassinations, indicating that preparations for such operations were discussed at the political level.
The disagreement therefore extends beyond whether assassinations were ever proposed. It concerns the precise instructions issued by Netanyahu, whether the intelligence and operational preparations were sufficiently developed, and why no strike ultimately took place.
Authorization to prepare an assassination operation is also distinct from an order to carry it out. Such missions generally require current intelligence concerning the target’s location, operational readiness, and an assessment of the possibility that the strike could trigger a wider war.
Bar’s allegations do not, by themselves, establish that an executable assassination plan was rejected or that eliminating Hamas leaders before October 7 would necessarily have prevented the massacre.
What Happened During the Hours Before the Massacre?
The lawsuit also addresses the events of the night between October 6 and October 7, when Israeli intelligence agencies detected unusual Hamas activity but failed to recognize that a massive invasion was imminent.
Netanyahu has accused Bar of failing to contact him directly despite receiving indications that Hamas was preparing some form of attack.
The prime minister argues that the Shin Bet director had access to secure communications systems and could have reached him immediately through the security personnel assigned to protect him.
Bar rejects the accusation that he deliberately withheld information.
According to his filing, the Shin Bet distributed an intelligence warning at 3:03 a.m. identifying indications of possible offensive activity by Hamas.
Bar also maintains that instructions were issued to notify Netanyahu’s military secretary and that the relevant communications were documented in the Shin Bet’s operational records.
Additional reporting on the lawsuit indicates that Bar personally spoke with Netanyahu on a secure line on July 23, 2023, and delivered what he described as a strategic warning of possible war. He reportedly warned that Israel’s enemies viewed the country’s internal divisions as an opportunity to launch attacks and urged consideration of preemptive military action.
The lawsuit further disputes Netanyahu’s suggestion that the Shin Bet director had authority over all the emergency measures that might have reduced casualties on October 7.
Bar argues that his agency was not responsible for commanding IDF forces, determining the deployment of local emergency response teams, or deciding whether civilian gatherings such as the Nova music festival should be evacuated.
Those responsibilities, he maintains, belonged to other elements of Israel’s military and civilian security establishment.
Bar Acknowledges Shin Bet’s Failures
Despite his accusations against Netanyahu, Bar acknowledges that the Shin Bet failed to provide the intelligence necessary to anticipate the scale and timing of the October 7 assault.
He says he accepted personal responsibility for those failures and ultimately resigned as director of the agency in June 2025.
Bar maintains, however, that accepting responsibility for the intelligence failure does not justify accusations that he knowingly concealed information about an impending massacre.
His lawsuit challenges statements published by Netanyahu on September 28, in which the prime minister accused him of serious failures and misconduct connected to the events preceding the Hamas attack.
Bar is seeking 3 million shekels in compensation, along with legal expenses and a correction or retraction of the disputed statements.
He is also asking the court to require the disclosure of relevant documents and records from the prime minister’s office, potentially bringing previously confidential security discussions into the legal proceedings.
In his filing, Bar connects the dispute to his earlier allegations involving individuals associated with Netanyahu’s office and their reported connections to Qatar, as well as claims that the prime minister sought to involve the Shin Bet in monitoring political demonstrations.
Netanyahu has disputed allegations of improper conduct, and the claims raised by Bar remain contested.
Bar argues that a formal state commission of inquiry should examine the decisions and intelligence failures surrounding October 7. In the absence of such an inquiry, he says the legal proceedings may provide an opportunity to establish a fuller public record.
Netanyahu Fires Back
Netanyahu responded sharply to the lawsuit, rejecting Bar’s explanation for why he did not personally telephone the prime minister during the hours before the attack.
“Ronen Bar, who saw the warning signs on the night of October 7 and did not call me, now says he didn’t have my phone number. Ronen, are you serious?” Netanyahu said.
“You had my secure hotline number, and you could have called me immediately, as all the heads of the security establishment do. The Shin Bet security guards, your subordinates, who are with me 24/7, could have reached me within minutes. How many lives could we have saved if only you had called in time?”
The prime minister’s response places renewed emphasis on the critical hours before the attack, when Israeli security agencies detected suspicious developments in Gaza but did not issue a warning commensurate with the scale of the assault that followed.
Bar’s lawsuit, meanwhile, seeks to broaden the examination beyond those final hours to include the government’s security policy throughout 2023, its handling of repeated warnings, and the decisions that left Hamas’s senior leadership in place.
The dispute now places before the courts competing accounts of the warnings, operational recommendations, and communications that preceded October 7, with Bar seeking the release of documents that he argues will substantiate his version of events.
{Matzav.com}