Yisrael Beiteinu chairman Avigdor Lieberman could hold the key to determining whether Israel’s next government is a broad unity coalition, a minority government supported by Arab parties, or whether the country returns to the polls for another election, according to veteran political commentator Yaakov Rivlin. In a wide-ranging analysis of Tuesday’s election results, Rivlin suggested that Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu’s weakened parliamentary position could create an opening for a unity government that might exclude the chareidi parties.
Speaking with journalist Avi Blum on Kol Chai’s main evening news broadcast Wednesday, Rivlin examined the complicated political situation emerging from the elections to the 26th Knesset. Although Netanyahu’s Likud performed considerably better than many pre-election polls had predicted, Rivlin argued that the prime minister had nevertheless suffered a substantial loss of coalition strength.
“Who holds the keys to all the governments? Avigdor Lieberman,” Rivlin declared, identifying the Yisrael Beiteinu leader as a potentially decisive figure in the negotiations over the next coalition.
Rivlin rejected the suggestion that Netanyahu’s electoral performance should be viewed as a victory simply because Likud exceeded expectations.
“We expected a defeat and got half a defeat,” he said, pointing to the decline in the prime minister’s parliamentary support.
The outgoing coalition controlled 68 seats in the Knesset, while the election results available at the time of the interview indicated that Netanyahu’s bloc had fallen to approximately 54 or 55 mandates. Rivlin maintained that the opposition’s failure to achieve a decisive majority did not erase the significance of that decline.
The loss of more than a dozen seats from the outgoing coalition’s strength means that Netanyahu can no longer rely on his traditional political partners to provide an automatic parliamentary majority.
Blum, however, suggested that the absence of a 61-seat majority could paradoxically give Netanyahu greater flexibility in coalition negotiations.
Under that scenario, the prime minister could argue that the election results require him to pursue a broad unity government rather than remain exclusively dependent on his longstanding right-wing and chareidi allies.
Such an arrangement might allow Netanyahu to negotiate with opposition leaders without being bound by all the demands of the parties that participated in his previous coalition.
Rivlin expressed reservations about that interpretation, pointing out that Netanyahu would still have to consider his relationship with Shas and United Torah Judaism.
Even if the prime minister succeeded in establishing a unity government without the chareidi parties, Rivlin argued, he would have an interest in preserving those relationships in case the new coalition eventually collapsed.
Abandoning his traditional allies could leave Netanyahu without a political safety net if a unity arrangement proved unsustainable.
The discussion then turned to the possibility that security developments, particularly a renewed confrontation with Iran, could dramatically alter the political calculations.
Rivlin raised the possibility that another major military escalation would intensify pressure on the political leadership to establish a national unity government.
“Everyone will demand a unity government. In that government, everyone will have to compromise. The chareidim will have to compromise on the draft law, if they are not left outside. Netanyahu will have to compromise, Eisenkot will have to compromise,” Rivlin said.
He emphasized that this was a hypothetical scenario dependent on future security developments, rather than information indicating that such a decision had already been reached.
A national emergency could potentially change the priorities of political leaders who currently oppose serving together, particularly if the country faced an extended military confrontation.
At the same time, Rivlin suggested that the military draft issue could become a decisive factor in determining whether Shas and United Torah Judaism would participate in such a coalition.
The parties have made the status of yeshiva bochurim a central political demand, while several potential unity partners have insisted on changes to existing military service arrangements.
If a compromise could not be reached, a unity government might be established without chareidi representation.
The alternative possibility of a minority government headed by Gadi Eisenkot also received considerable attention during the interview.
Eisenkot’s opposition bloc, together with the Arab parties, could potentially command enough parliamentary support to challenge Netanyahu’s continued leadership. However, Rivlin questioned whether such an arrangement could be translated into a functioning government.
He identified Lieberman as a major obstacle to a government dependent on Arab parliamentary support.
The Yisrael Beiteinu chairman has long opposed relying on Arab parties to establish a coalition, and his position could complicate efforts to form an Eisenkot-led minority government.
According to Rivlin’s analysis, if Lieberman refuses to support such an arrangement, the remaining political leaders may have to choose between negotiating a unity government and preparing for another election.
Lieberman’s position is particularly significant because the opposition contains parties with sharply different views on security, religion and state, and cooperation with Arab political factions.
Those differences could make it difficult to transform a shared desire to replace Netanyahu into a workable governing agreement.
The conversation also focused extensively on the disappointing election results for Shas, which appears to have suffered a considerable decline in voter support.
Rivlin estimated that the party had lost nearly 100,000 votes compared with the previous election, with the decline evident not only in development towns and peripheral communities but also in established chareidi population centers.
He attributed part of the decline to changes in the voting behavior of traditional Sephardic voters who had previously supported Shas.
In earlier elections, Rivlin explained, Shas had successfully appealed to voters who identified with Jewish tradition but were not necessarily part of the chareidi community.
The party presented itself as an alternative to Likud that combined a traditional Jewish identity with political representation for Sephardic communities.
This time, however, the military draft controversy and Likud’s aggressive campaign emphasizing the importance of voting for a large party appeared to influence some of those voters to return to Netanyahu’s party.
Rivlin suggested that Shas had struggled to communicate a message capable of satisfying both its chareidi base and its broader traditional electorate.
The ongoing controversy over the conscription of yeshiva students, together with the arrests of bochurim, created tensions within the Sephardic community and complicated the party’s electoral messaging.
Attempts to present Torah study and military service as compatible national priorities did not necessarily resonate with all segments of the party’s electorate, Rivlin argued.
He also pointed to shortcomings in the party’s local election operations.
Although Shas maintained an organized campaign infrastructure, some local representatives failed to produce the number of votes expected of them.
Rivlin suggested that the results could lead to an internal review of those representatives’ performance and potentially affect their positions within the party.
The contrast with United Torah Judaism was particularly striking.
While Shas experienced a substantial decline, United Torah Judaism maintained its projected parliamentary representation and increased its overall vote total.
Rivlin attributed the party’s performance partly to changes within Degel HaTorah that were carried out under the direction of its rabbinic leadership.
He also credited MK Yaakov Asher with helping to bring together competing elements within a party that had experienced significant internal disagreements.
“Yaakov Asher succeeded in creating a consensus,” Rivlin said, describing the efforts to preserve unity within United Torah Judaism.
The ability to maintain internal cooperation despite disagreements was an important factor in the party’s electoral performance, according to his assessment.
Blum suggested that the clarity of United Torah Judaism’s rabbinic leadership may also have contributed to its ability to mobilize voters.
He contrasted that situation with the challenges facing Shas, whose leadership had struggled to present a message that appealed equally to its different constituencies.
Rivlin cautioned, however, that a definitive assessment would require a detailed examination of the final results from individual cities and polling stations.
Such an analysis would help establish where Shas lost support, where United Torah Judaism gained votes, and whether the changes reflected broader political trends or specific local circumstances.
Rivlin also recalled the 2015 Knesset election, when Shas won seven seats while facing a challenge from Eli Yishai, who had broken away from the party to establish a competing political movement.
At the time, securing seven mandates was considered a significant achievement because Shas had been forced to contend with a rival party seeking support from the same electoral base.
The present election, Rivlin argued, presents a very different picture.
Rather than defending its position against a major internal challenger, Shas entered the election as an established coalition party with an extensive political organization.
Its decline to approximately seven seats therefore carries different implications than the same numerical result did in 2015.
Nevertheless, both Rivlin and Blum emphasized that the ultimate political significance of the election would depend not only on how many seats the chareidi parties received but also on whether they would participate in the next government.
A party with fewer mandates could still wield considerable influence if its support were essential to establishing a coalition.
Conversely, even a party that maintained its parliamentary representation could find itself excluded from power if other factions succeeded in forming a government without it.
That possibility has become increasingly relevant as political figures examine combinations that could include Netanyahu and opposition parties while leaving Shas and United Torah Judaism outside the coalition.
For the chareidi parties, the outcome of the coalition negotiations could have far-reaching consequences for the military draft issue, educational funding, religious institutions, and other matters central to their constituencies.
The election results have also placed Netanyahu in an unfamiliar position, requiring him to consider arrangements beyond the political bloc that has supported his government.
Although his parliamentary strength has declined, the divisions among his opponents have prevented the emergence of a straightforward alternative.
Rivlin’s assessment was that Lieberman’s decisions could become critical in determining which of the competing political scenarios ultimately takes shape.
If Lieberman refuses to support a minority government dependent on Arab parties, the opposition’s options could narrow considerably. At the same time, Netanyahu would still need to persuade political rivals to join a coalition under his leadership.
The result is a political deadlock in which both camps face significant obstacles, and negotiations over the next government could prove as consequential as the election itself.
The final allocation of Knesset seats remains subject to the counting of outstanding ballots, and the coalition possibilities discussed by Rivlin are political scenarios rather than confirmed agreements. His analysis nevertheless highlights a central question emerging from the election: whether Netanyahu’s loss of parliamentary strength will lead to a change in government, another election, or a broader coalition that could fundamentally alter the political position of the chareidi parties.
{Matzav.com}
