ANALYSIS: WHERE DID THE VOTES GO? Shas Loses More Than 20% of Its Support in Chareidi Strongholds — But Who Got Those Votes?
A dramatic decline in support for Shas across Israel’s chareidi communities has emerged as one of the most significant developments in Tuesday’s Knesset election, with new voting figures showing that the Sephardic chareidi party lost more than 20% of its support in major chareidi population centers, despite unusually strong voter participation.
In some outlying communities, Shas experienced an even steeper decline, approaching 40%, raising serious questions about where its traditional voters went and why the party failed to retain its previous level of support.
The findings are particularly striking because they undermine the explanation that the party’s losses were primarily the result of low turnout among chareidi voters. In fact, the four major chareidi cities of Bnei Brak, Modiin Illit, Beitar Illit and Elad recorded a combined turnout of 79.5%, substantially higher than the turnout reported in Israel’s largest cities.
The figures were presented Wednesday by Betzalel Kahn, a senior Kol Chai radio broadcaster and political commentator, during an interview with Ariel Berman on the station’s afternoon news program.
Kahn analyzed the election results after approximately 77.6% of the votes had been entered into the Central Elections Committee’s system, identifying a significant erosion of Shas support even in communities where chareidi voters turned out in large numbers.
According to the figures he presented, Shas was projected to receive seven Knesset seats, the same number as United Torah Judaism, marking a substantial change in the balance of political power between the two established chareidi parties.
The combined strength of Shas and UTJ stood at 14 seats, down four from their representation in the previous Knesset.
The results have prompted questions about the future of Shas and the ability of its leadership to maintain the broad electoral coalition that previously made it Israel’s largest chareidi party.
The scale of the losses becomes clearer when examining the voting figures from individual chareidi cities.
In Beitar Illit, where all 55 polling stations had been counted, Shas received 6,027 votes, compared with 7,303 in the 2022 election. That represents a decline of 17.5% in the party’s vote total, even as the city’s overall turnout reached 80.3%.
United Torah Judaism, meanwhile, increased its vote total in Beitar Illit from 14,081 to 18,033, a gain of 28.1%. Its share of the city’s vote rose to 64.3%, compared with 59.1% in the previous election.
The contrast was particularly pronounced because Shas’s share of the Beitar Illit vote fell from 30.6% to 21.5%, a decline of more than nine percentage points.
A similar pattern emerged in Modiin Illit, where UTJ received 25,242 votes, compared with 20,662 in 2022, an increase of 4,580 votes.
Shas, by contrast, received 4,746 votes in Modiin Illit, down from 5,277 in the previous election, a decline of approximately 10.1%.
The city’s voter turnout reached 83.82%, further demonstrating that Shas’s losses cannot simply be attributed to a lack of participation among chareidi residents.
In Elad, UTJ increased its vote total from 6,862 to 8,456, a gain of 23.2%. Shas declined from 9,743 to 8,920 votes, losing 823 votes, or approximately 8.4%.
Taken together, the results from Elad, Beitar Illit and Modiin Illit reveal a pronounced shift in the balance between the two parties.
UTJ gained 10,126 votes across those three cities compared with the previous election, while Shas lost 2,630 votes.
That means UTJ increased its combined vote total in the three cities by approximately 24.3%, while Shas experienced an overall decline of approximately 11.8%.
The figures do not establish that every voter who abandoned Shas switched directly to UTJ, but they demonstrate that the two parties experienced sharply different electoral trends in the same communities.
Kahn suggested that some former Shas voters did move to UTJ, while a smaller number may have supported Itamar Ben Gvir’s Otzma Yehudit party. Others may have voted for smaller parties or abstained altogether.
The losses were not confined to the established chareidi cities.
An analysis by Dr. Gilad Malach of the Israel Democracy Institute indicated that Shas had suffered declines of approximately 42% in peripheral communities and roughly 25% in chareidi population centers.
Among the most pronounced declines were Dimona, where Shas’s support fell by approximately 48.5%, Netivot, where it declined by 46.3%, Ofakim, where the decrease reached 45%, and Sderot, where support dropped by 42.1%.
Additional declines were reported in Ashkelon, at 39.9%; Netanya, at 39%; Ashdod, at 37.2%; and Cholon, at 29.6%.
The results are especially consequential for Shas because its political strength has historically depended on support extending beyond the established chareidi community into traditional Sephardic neighborhoods and development towns throughout Israel.
The party’s ability to attract voters from those communities helped distinguish it from UTJ, whose support is concentrated more heavily among Ashkenazic chareidi voters.
A contraction in both sectors would therefore present Shas with a broader electoral challenge than a decline limited to a handful of chareidi cities.
Kahn also pointed to the issue of natural population growth.
Even maintaining its previous number of votes would not necessarily have represented growth for Shas, given the expanding population of the communities from which it draws support.
Instead, the party has experienced an actual reduction in votes in numerous locations, despite the larger potential electorate.
The election results also revealed the presence of smaller chareidi political lists that challenged the established parties, although neither came close to crossing the electoral threshold.
According to the partial figures presented by Kahn, the Tzeva Shachor, or Black Color, protest list had received approximately 9,300 votes, surpassing the approximately 8,750 votes recorded for Moti Leitner’s Hatzibur Hachareidi party.
Kahn said he had previously estimated that Leitner’s party would fail to reach 10,000 votes, and the partial results appeared consistent with that assessment.
Although those lists attracted only a small share of the electorate, their participation added another dimension to the internal disagreements that characterized the chareidi election campaign.
Kahn also discussed the broader political picture emerging from the count.
At the stage he analyzed, Netanyahu’s bloc stood at 54 seats, the opposition parties at 49, and the Arab parties at 17.
Likud was allocated 27 seats in the interim calculation, while Shas, UTJ and Otzma Yehudit each stood at seven, and Religious Zionism at six.
Those figures were provisional and subject to change as additional ballots were counted and the final allocation of Knesset seats was calculated.
Kahn also cautioned against automatically counting UTJ as a guaranteed member of Netanyahu’s bloc.
He recalled that Rav Dov Landau had declared that there was no longer a right-wing bloc from the perspective of the chareidi parties, while UTJ’s Yaakov Asher had emphasized that the party regarded itself as part of a Torah bloc rather than a conventional political alliance.
“Rav Dov Landau said there is no longer a right-wing bloc, and Yaakov Asher said that we are the Torah bloc. Whoever wants us will have to pay the price we demand,” Kahn said, recalling those positions.
That distinction could become significant during coalition negotiations, particularly given the continuing dispute over the military draft and the status of yeshiva students.
For Shas, however, the more immediate issue is the substantial decline in support revealed by the election results.
The party entered the election with 11 Knesset seats, while UTJ held seven. The possibility that both parties could emerge with roughly equal representation would constitute a major change in their relative parliamentary strength.
The final seat allocation remains dependent on the completion of the count, including ballots that have not yet been processed.
Nevertheless, the municipal voting figures already available reveal a consistent pattern: UTJ increased its support in several major chareidi communities while Shas lost votes, despite strong overall participation.
The question confronting Shas is therefore considerably more complicated than whether its supporters failed to turn out on Election Day.
In communities where nearly eight out of every ten eligible residents voted, substantial numbers of people who previously supported Shas appear to have made a different electoral choice.
Determining why those voters changed their preferences, and whether the shift represents a temporary reaction to the latest election campaign or a more lasting realignment, will be a central question for Shas leaders as they assess the results of the 2026 election.
{Matzav.com}
