New findings from the Institute for Chareidi Strategy and Policy are raising serious questions about many assumptions that have long shaped public discussion of the chareidi community in Israel. The data points to significant demographic, economic, and social shifts that together paint a far more complicated picture than is often assumed.
In an interview on Kikar FM with Eli Gothelf, Dr. Eitan Regev, vice president for research and data at the institute, summed up the situation succinctly. “The picture is complex,” he said. “There are areas where we see improvement, areas that are standing in place, and economic pressures that weigh on everything.”
At the center of the report is a sharp decline in birthrates. According to Regev, the chareidi public in Israel is currently experiencing its lowest fertility levels in nearly forty years. Two decades ago, the average chareidi family had 7.3 children. Today, that number stands at 6.2. Regev explained that the drop reflects a combination of factors, including housing pressures, ongoing financial strain, increased attention to the physical and emotional wellbeing of women, and a steady rise in academic education among chareidi women.
He noted that additional factors further change the overall demographic picture. Various studies show that 13 to 14 percent of those raised within the chareidi world eventually leave it, a figure Regev stressed cannot be ignored. He also said updated population estimates place the current chareidi population at roughly 1.3 million, rather than the 1.4 million cited in earlier projections.
These revisions have led the institute to update long-term forecasts. Contrary to the commonly repeated claim that chareidim will comprise about one-third of Israel’s population by 2065, Regev said the institute’s current projection is significantly lower, at 20 to 22 percent. He explained that older forecasts relied on higher historical birthrates and did not sufficiently account for attrition. As the community grows larger, he said, the absolute number of those leaving becomes more meaningful and no longer balances itself out.
The report also highlights differences within the chareidi public. According to the data presented, the chassidic sector continues to have the highest birthrates, averaging around seven children per family. The steepest decline has been recorded among Sephardic chareidim, where the average is about 5.2 children. The Litvishe sector falls in between, with an average of roughly 6.5 children.
Education trends among women show similarly wide gaps. Overall, about 16 percent of chareidi women hold an academic degree, but the breakdown by group is striking. Among chassidic women, the figure stands at just 5 to 6 percent. Among Sephardic and Litvishe women, it is around 17 to 18 percent, while among Chabad women it approaches 40 percent. Regev added that among women aged 30 to 34, nearly 19 percent already hold academic degrees, meaning close to one out of every five.
On the employment front, Regev said chareidi male employment saw a noticeable rise in 2022, largely driven by rising interest rates and higher mortgage payments. That trend reversed in 2023 and 2024. He attributed the decline to uncertainty surrounding the draft law, particularly among younger men, as well as possible concerns about reporting employment. “The State of Israel keeps making the same mistake by tying employment to the draft issue,” he said, warning that this linkage harms both sides.
Another indicator of longer-term change, Regev suggested, is the rapid growth of state-chareidi education. Within just two years, the share of boys in elementary school enrolled in these frameworks doubled from about 4 percent to 8 percent, and this year has already reached roughly 9 to 10 percent. He described this as a conscious parental decision, reflecting an understanding that children will need broader tools going forward, including core studies.
The most dramatic data, however, emerged in the area of housing. Regev said that in 2023 there was a 30 percent drop in the number of young chareidi couples able to purchase their first apartment. Although 2024 saw some recovery, levels remain well below those of 2019. Survey data collected by the institute shows that about 70 percent of chareidi families now assume they may need to live in rental housing.
According to Regev, this represents a major disruption to the traditional chareidi economic model. For decades, owning an apartment served not only as housing but also as savings and a foundation for helping children later on. In a high-interest-rate environment, fewer couples can take on a mortgage, and those who do pay far more interest and far less principal, weakening the savings element. He noted a growing move toward alternative investments, some safer and some riskier, creating greater variation between families where once there was a fairly uniform model.
Regev concluded that the convergence of declining birthrates, housing challenges, rising female education, shifts in male employment, and the growth of state-chareidi schooling points to a deeper structural change. These trends, he said, do not reflect a passing phase but an ongoing process in which the chareidi public is being forced to rethink and rebuild its economic model while still in motion.
{Matzav.com}
