The Israel Defense Forces disclosed Wednesday morning that significant sums of money—amounting to tens of millions of dollars—were raised and delivered to Hamas’ military wing over the past year, even more than two years into the war.
The disclosure came in a statement published on X by IDF Arabic-language spokesperson Avichay Adraee, who described a recent joint action carried out by the IDF and the Shin Bet. According to Adraee, the operation resulted in the killing of a key Hamas figure involved in terror financing.
“In a joint operation by the Israel Defense Forces and the General Security Service (Shin Bet), two weeks ago, the Hamas terrorist Abdel Hay Zoqout from the residents of Gaza City was eliminated. He belonged to the finance department in the military wing of the organization. He was eliminated while in his vehicle, alongside the individual Ra’ad Sa’ad.”
Adraee said Zoqout played a central role in sustaining Hamas’ military capabilities through financial channels. “During the past year, Zoqout was responsible for recruiting tens of millions of dollars and transferring them to Hamas’s military wing, with the aim of continuing the fight against the State of Israel,” he said.
He added that Israeli security forces remain committed to targeting such networks. “The Israel Defense Forces and Shin Bet will continue their efforts to cut off terrorism funding channels, and will work against every entity involved in terrorism or in providing assistance to plan and execute terrorist plots against the State of Israel.”
Further details released by Israeli officials clarified that Ra’ad Sa’ad, described as a senior operative in Hamas’ military wing, was killed in an airstrike in western Gaza City on December 13. Sa’ad had spent an extended period operating within Hamas’ tunnel network beneath the city.
Security sources said that shortly before the strike, Sa’ad left the tunnel system and traveled by car. When the vehicle reached the Al-Nabulsi Square area, it was hit by multiple missiles. Abdel Hay Zoqout was also killed in that strike.
According to those sources, Sa’ad was considered a close deputy of Az a-Din al-Haddad and effectively functioned as head of operations, as well as the commander overseeing the production of rockets, mortars, and anti-tank missiles.
He was involved in top-level decision-making within Hamas’ military wing and possessed extensive intelligence knowledge, including detailed familiarity with the organization’s tunnel infrastructure. In November 2023, the IDF distributed leaflets across Gaza offering an $800,000 reward for information leading to his capture. An earlier attempt to eliminate him, carried out in June of last year, was unsuccessful.
{Matzav.com}
Persistent breaches in the security barrier near the Qalandiya checkpoint and the northern Yerushalayim neighborhood of Neve Yaakov have turned the area into a flashpoint, with a sharp rise in unauthorized crossings from Palestinian Authority-controlled areas into Israel.
Israeli security officials say the scope of the problem has expanded dramatically since the outbreak of the war. A security source cited by Yediot Acharonot estimated that roughly 6,000 infiltrations now occur each week through gaps in the fence—double the number recorded prior to the fighting. According to the source, a notable share of terror attacks inside pre-1967 Israel has been linked, directly or indirectly, to these crossings.
The infiltrations are often facilitated by paid intermediaries. Palestinians reportedly pay between 300 and 600 shekels to be guided through breaches that are deliberately cut into the barrier. Once across, a waiting driver transports them deeper into Israeli territory.
In response, security forces have stepped up enforcement along the fence, deploying ambushes around the clock in an effort to intercept those crossing illegally. Since the war began, a temporary directive has been in force allowing forces to open fire at infiltrators breaching the barrier, with instructions to aim at the lower body as a means of stopping crossings and restoring deterrence.
The growing concern over these vulnerabilities is echoed in a newly released State Comptroller’s audit focusing on the Seam Line barrier and crossings in the Jerusalem perimeter. On Tuesday, State Comptroller Matanyahu Engelman published a wide-ranging report that examined long-standing shortcomings in security preparedness, operations, and the implementation of government policy—issues brought into sharper focus by the October 7 massacre and the ongoing Swords of Iron War.
According to the audit, only 61 percent of the several-hundred-kilometer seam line is currently fitted with a physical barrier. In many other sections, wide openings remain, allowing Palestinians to pass without any inspection. Engelman highlighted especially severe gaps, including uninterrupted stretches of 11 kilometers on one route and six kilometers on another where no obstacle exists at all, warning that such conditions pose a serious risk of terrorist infiltration.
The report also faulted authorities for the lack of an organized operating framework at the crossings. Despite a 2005 decision by the Prime Minister to transfer management of the crossings to civilian control, not a single crossing in the Jerusalem perimeter has been civilianized to this day. The audit further criticized the Shin Bet for failing to adequately implement professional recommendations tied to these changes.
Operational problems were also flagged within the Israel Police, which have managed the crossings for roughly two decades without a formal doctrine or permanent command structure. Of the 16 crossings in the sector, only two are headed by commanders officially authorized for the position. Engelman cautioned that this arrangement undermines coordination among the IDF, Israel Police, Border Guard, and civilian security elements, creating dangerous security gaps.
On the ground, the audit found that Border Guard units were frequently reassigned from routine seam line duties to other missions, weakening the overall defensive posture in the area. Inconsistent reporting between the IDF and police regarding infiltration incidents further contributed to what the Comptroller described as a fragmented and insufficient response.
Additional deficiencies cited include aging infrastructure, manpower shortages, inadequate screening equipment, and poor coordination between government ministries. One case highlighted was the prolonged delay in opening the subsidence road at the Qalandiya crossing, which stemmed from unresolved disputes between the Transportation Ministry and the police.
Among Engelman’s recommendations are the immediate closure of open gaps in the barrier, completion of the long-delayed civilianization of the crossings, and the establishment of a clear and binding police operating doctrine. The report also calls for improved intelligence-sharing across all security bodies and a reassessment of the barrier’s route based on updated threat evaluations.
{Matzav.com}
Two Likud Knesset members, Tally Gotliv and Moshe Saada, notified a Knesset security official on Wednesday that their personal cellphones had been compromised. According to Walla! News reporter Yehuda Shlezinger, data taken from the devices was allegedly circulated on the dark web.
The lawmakers said they were alerted to the breach by a former police officer now working in the cyber field, who told them that information extracted from their phones had begun spreading in underground online forums.
The disclosures come after claims last week by the Iranian-linked hacker group Handala, which asserted it had penetrated the personal phone of former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett. The group said it had released a trove of material taken from an iPhone 13, including a contacts list, a chat with Avia Sassi, photos, videos, and an audio recording. Among the contacts allegedly exposed, along with phone numbers, were UAE Prime Minister Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum and French President Emmanuel Macron. Bennett’s office said the device was examined and found not to have been hacked.
In a statement, Bennett’s office said: “The issue is being handled by security authorities. Israel’s enemies will do everything to prevent me from becoming Prime Minister again. It will not help them. No one will stop me from acting and fighting for the State of Israel and the Jewish people. After further investigation, it appears that while my phone itself was not hacked, access was gained to my Telegram account in various ways. Content from my phone’s contact list, as well as authentic and fake photos and chats (including a photo of me next to Ben Gurion), were circulated. This content was obtained unlawfully, and its distribution constitutes a criminal offense.”
{Matzav.com}
