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The White House is pushing back forcefully against claims that President Trump suggested Iran should attack Los Angeles or San Diego, saying his controversial remarks at a Nebraska campaign rally were being stripped of their broader context and that Trump was actually arguing that the war had prevented a nuclear-armed Iran from gaining the ability to destroy an American city.

The controversy erupted after Trump addressed supporters Monday in Grand Island, Nebraska, while defending the ongoing war with Iran and acknowledging the economic pain Americans have experienced, particularly from higher fuel prices. The president argued that those costs were comparatively minor if the conflict prevents Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons and threatening the United States.

“We want to see a tremendous victory. You want to see a tremendous victory because it verifies all the things we did. And again, remember, with the war, it’s just artificial. It’s a little bit high. It’s a small price to pay for keeping the world safe, keeping our country safe.”

Trump then delivered the comments that quickly ignited a political firestorm.

“They can take out a city. Let them take — let them take out Los Angeles. Let them take out San Diego. This is a very small price to pay, and it’s going to be over with very soon. It’s essentially almost over with, and they might keep going a little long,” he continued.

“You know, they always say they have a big threshold for pain. They need it. Let me tell you, they need it. But it’s going to end very soon, and it’ll end one way or the other,” Trump added.

The wording immediately drew condemnation from California officials, who interpreted the remarks literally as Trump saying the destruction of Los Angeles or San Diego would constitute an acceptable price for the war.

California Gov. Gavin Newsom accused Trump of effectively inviting an enemy nation to attack two major American cities.

“After sending the National Guard and Marines to occupy California, Donald Trump is now saying our foreign enemies should ‘take out’ Los Angeles and San Diego,” Newsom claimed. “He is deranged and dangerous.”

Newsom subsequently announced that he was “directing the State Threat Assessment Center to actively monitor the situation in the event that foreign actors interpret the President’s remarks as an invitation to target California,” while suggesting that Trump’s comments could potentially be “treasonous.”

Los Angeles Mayor Karen Bass similarly condemned the president, arguing that his language could have real-world security consequences.

“The President of the United States suggested that a foreign government attack Los Angeles. His statements against our city are dangerous and could potentially compromise our safety.”

“The role of a president is to protect the country, not to actively threaten it and encourage attacks on American lives,” she added. “In the face of irresponsible threats, as Angelenos, we know how to stand together and protect our city.”

San Diego Mayor Todd Gloria also joined the criticism, declaring that his city could never be treated as expendable in a military conflict.

“San Diego is not collateral damage,” Gloria said. “We are not expendable. And we are never a ‘small price to pay.’ Keep our city out of your reckless war talk.”

The White House, however, says that interpretation badly misrepresents Trump’s point. Administration officials said the president was discussing the potential consequences of allowing Iran to obtain a nuclear weapon and was arguing that the temporary economic costs associated with preventing that outcome are a small price compared with the destruction that a nuclear Iran could eventually inflict.

The White House’s Rapid Response account issued an unusually blunt response after a Los Angeles Times headline characterized Trump as suggesting that Iran be allowed to attack the California cities.

“No, he didn’t, you buffoons,” Rapid Response said.

“He was saying the U.S. is fighting to STOP Iran from having the ability to take out LA and San Diego with a nuclear weapon — which they would if they had the chance,” it continued.

White House Communications Director Steven Cheung offered the same explanation, saying the uproar surrounding the remarks is “not rooted in reality”.

“He was clearly stating US cities would have been threatened if a nuclear Iran hadn’t been stopped,” Cheung said. “America is safer because of the President. Iran has no nuclear, no navy, no air force, and no money”.

A review of Trump’s broader comments during the Nebraska appearance shows that the remarks came during an extended discussion of the economic consequences of the Iran war, particularly gasoline prices, and his contention that Americans were paying a relatively modest price to eliminate a far greater potential threat.

Trump had made that argument more explicitly earlier, telling a Nebraska news outlet that the higher cost of fuel would subside once the conflict ended and directly linking the economic sacrifice to preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.

“We’re going to get [the cost of fuel] down,” Trump said. “But it’s all going to come pouring down as soon as the war’s over, which will be very soon. And we will not have Iran having a nuclear weapon. And that’s going to be — and I say it and I say it proudly — a relatively small price to pay for keeping nuclear weapons out of the hands of a lunatic nation.”

Trump has repeatedly argued that Iran’s nuclear ambitions ultimately posed a threat beyond Israel and the Middle East. In his February State of the Union address, shortly before the U.S.-Israeli military campaign against Iran began, Trump warned that Tehran was “working to build missiles that will soon reach the United States of America.”

Iran, however, is not currently known to possess a nuclear weapon or an operational ballistic missile capable of striking the continental United States directly from Iranian territory. Its longest-range operational ballistic missiles fall far short of the distance required to reach California, although U.S. officials have long warned that technologies developed through Iran’s space-launch program could contribute to a future intercontinental ballistic missile capability.

That distinction has become part of the broader argument over Trump’s remarks. Critics contend that regardless of his intended point, a president should not use language that can be heard as suggesting an enemy could be permitted to destroy American cities. The White House counters that Trump’s meaning becomes apparent when the comments are viewed alongside his repeated warnings about what Iran could eventually do if permitted to acquire nuclear weapons and long-range delivery systems.

{Matzav.com}

New satellite imagery indicates that Iran has resumed substantial activity at Minzadayi, a secret nuclear weapons development compound northeast of Tehran that was heavily bombed by Israel in March, raising concerns that Tehran may be attempting to rebuild capabilities destroyed during Operation Roaring Lion.

High-resolution images taken by VANTOR Technologies during September and early October show renewed vehicle traffic throughout the compound, extensive cleanup work and fresh earthmoving at an area struck during the Israeli attack, according to an analysis released this week by the Institute for Science and International Security.

The institute warned that the activity could represent considerably more than an effort to clean up the damage left by Israeli airstrikes, saying the work may signal an attempt to restore the site’s previous capabilities.

“Given what is known about this compound, this activity may be indicative of an effort by Iran to reestablish a nuclear weapons development capability and to reconstitute what was lost in the attack on the compound,” the institute said.

Israel attacked Minzadayi on March 3, after identifying the heavily secured facility as a clandestine nuclear weapons development center. The strike destroyed several above-ground buildings and apparently damaged underground portions of the complex as well.

At the time of the attack, the IDF said the previously undisclosed compound was a secret “nuclear headquarters” where Iranian scientists had been working covertly on the development of a critical component for a nuclear weapon.

The site is situated off Sohanak Road northeast of Tehran in an area containing parkland and recreational facilities. Analysts who examined the location described a heavily protected compound surrounded by a high wall and guard towers, with two clusters of buildings above ground and additional structures built into the surrounding hillside.

Satellite photographs taken immediately after the March attack showed extensive destruction inside the compound. Multiple buildings had been demolished, while craters and other evidence suggested that Israel had also targeted areas believed to conceal underground facilities.

In the months that followed, Iran launched an extensive cleanup operation at Minzadayi. Rubble and other debris were hauled away, while damage to the hillside caused by the Israeli strikes was repaired.

The latest imagery, however, shows that activity has continued beyond the initial removal of debris. A substantial number of vehicles were visible across the facility during September and early October, suggesting that regular access to the compound has resumed.

Analysts also identified continuing earthmoving in an area that was directly struck in March. The work is taking place at what appears from above to be a courtyard, but side-view imagery indicates that the area contains an underground section. Numerous impact craters had been visible there following the Israeli attack.

The renewed work at Minzadayi is particularly significant because the compound has been linked to Iranian research involving nuclear warhead development rather than merely the civilian components of Tehran’s nuclear program.

The facility was among a series of sensitive nuclear and weapons-related locations attacked during Operation Roaring Lion as Israel sought to cripple Iran’s ability to develop a nuclear weapon and destroy infrastructure that could allow Tehran to rebuild the program.

Minzadayi is not the only nuclear-related facility where Iran has recently undertaken significant reconstruction. Satellite imagery released in September showed Tehran rapidly rebuilding the Taleghan 2 facility at the Parchin military complex, approximately 20 miles southeast of Tehran.

Taleghan 2 has long been associated with research relevant to nuclear weapons. Western intelligence assessments have linked the site to experiments conducted more than two decades ago involving explosives and technologies that could be used in the development of a nuclear warhead.

Recent imagery showed heavy construction equipment at Taleghan 2, including bulldozers, dump trucks, cranes, concrete mixers and concrete pumping vehicles. Iran also erected a large tarp over the destroyed hardened structure, obstructing satellite and aerial observation of some of the reconstruction underneath.

Iran has additionally reinforced parts of Taleghan 2 with new concrete intended to provide greater protection against future aerial attacks. Repair work there began in June, including the placement of concrete caps over penetration holes created by bunker-busting weapons.

“What is clear is that Iran remains committed to rebuilding this facility, a deeply concerning development considering the long history of nuclear weapons research and development activities that occurred there,” the institute said in its assessment of the Taleghan 2 reconstruction.

Iran has also taken steps to protect other sensitive nuclear locations. At Natanz and the facility known as Pickaxe Mountain, satellite imagery has shown new measures intended to restrict or harden access to underground areas containing potentially valuable nuclear equipment or material.

President Trump has publicly warned Tehran that the United States is closely watching Pickaxe Mountain, a deeply buried facility that has drawn growing attention over concerns about Iran’s nuclear activities.

“We have eyes on it and Pickaxe mountain is a possible target for a nice big fat shot right in the front door…We’re watching Pickaxe Mountain very closely. We don’t see any activity there.”

Trump subsequently issued an even more explicit warning: “We’re going to take out Pickaxe Mountain. Tell the Iranians to be ​ready.”

Iran has demonstrated a broader ability to repair military infrastructure damaged during the war faster than some Western analysts initially expected. By May, reports indicated that Iranian crews had already reopened 50 of 69 entrances to underground missile facilities that had been blocked during the fighting.

Satellite imagery from that period also showed reconstruction underway at ballistic missile production facilities, reinforcing concerns that Tehran was working rapidly to restore strategic capabilities degraded by the Israeli and American air campaign.

During Operation Roaring Lion, Israel carried out more than 10,800 strikes across Iran, dropping over 18,000 munitions. Approximately 4,000 targets and more than 6,700 individual components were struck during the campaign.

By the time the ceasefire took effect, the IDF assessed that nearly every facility identified before the campaign as a “vital and strategic” target had been rendered inoperable.

{Matzav.com}

Vice President JD Vance says the United States will not agree to end its seven-month war with Iran unless Tehran takes concrete action to significantly reduce its uranium-enrichment capabilities, insisting that Washington will accept neither promises nor vague commitments in place of actual nuclear concessions.

Vance laid out the administration’s position in an interview following a campaign trip to Alaska, where he said any agreement with Tehran would have to include a meaningful reduction in Iran’s ability to produce highly enriched uranium.

“If you don’t want a nuclear weapon, then why do you need 60% enriched fuel? And if you want to show commitment to not building a nuclear ⁠weapon, don’t build highly enriched fuel. That’s a very basic threshold issue,” Vance said.

“I think if they want to show a commitment to not building a nuclear weapon, they would do something meaningful on their enrichment capacity.”

The remarks provide one of the clearest indications yet of what the Trump administration would require from Iran as part of an agreement to halt the fighting. Vance, who has long expressed skepticism about prolonged American involvement in overseas wars, has emerged as a major figure in the administration’s efforts to negotiate an end to the conflict.

Vance previously helped broker a provisional peace agreement in September, but the arrangement quickly collapsed. Washington and Tehran have continued exchanging proposals in recent weeks as mediators seek a formula that could end the war and normalize commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.

President Trump rejected Iran’s latest proposal, which included demands connected to the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, sanctions relief, access to blocked ports and the release of frozen Iranian assets. Iranian officials subsequently said Tehran had received an official American response to its proposal, while Qatar and Pakistan have continued mediation efforts between the two sides.

Vance made clear that Washington remains prepared to negotiate, but said Tehran will have to demonstrate through its conduct that it is prepared to move away from the possibility of developing a nuclear weapon.

“We’re not going to trade words for actions,” Vance said.

The vice president’s comments come as the Trump administration continues to insist that preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon remains a central American objective, even as the conflict has expanded far beyond Iran’s nuclear facilities and caused major disruptions to global energy markets and shipping.

Iran’s enrichment of uranium to 60% purity has long been a central concern for Washington and Israel. That level is far beyond what is ordinarily required for civilian nuclear power and represents a relatively short technical step from weapons-grade material, although Iran has repeatedly denied that it intends to build a nuclear weapon.

Another major obstacle facing American negotiators, Vance said, is uncertainty over who actually has the authority to make binding decisions inside Iran following the upheaval caused by the war.

Washington has been negotiating with Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, but Vance said American officials remain uncertain about how much authority the two men possess within Iran’s fractured wartime power structure.

“One of the things we picked up on is it’s not totally clear how their country makes decisions,” Vance said.

The question has become particularly acute since joint U.S.-Israeli strikes at the beginning of the war killed Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, leaving Washington attempting to determine where ultimate decision-making authority now rests inside the Islamic Republic.

Iran has pushed back against that characterization. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei said American officials know precisely who their Iranian counterparts are and understand Tehran’s decision-making structure.

“The problem is actually the opposite: it lies in the contradictory positions and mixed messaging from US officials,” Baghaei said.

President Trump raised the same concern Tuesday during an appearance in Maryland, saying the uncertainty surrounding Iran’s leadership has become one of the biggest obstacles to resolving the conflict.

Trump said his “biggest problem” is that no one knows who is running Iran.

At the same event, Trump suggested that the war could be approaching its conclusion but warned that Tehran’s decisions will determine whether it ends through negotiations or through additional American military action.

“We’re doing extremely well in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Very well. The whole place is shot. They were the bully of the Middle East. They’re not so much the bully anymore. But we have to finish up, and it’s only a question of which way we want to do it: the nice way or the not-so-nice way. And pretty soon you’ll find out,” Trump said.

Vance, meanwhile, said he has personally spoken with American field commanders to obtain a direct assessment of battlefield conditions. He dismissed concerns that the United States is running dangerously short of critical munitions as a result of the prolonged conflict.

The vice president also said Iranian forces remain capable of periodically attacking commercial vessels traveling through the Strait of Hormuz but have largely failed to prevent energy shipments from moving through the strategically vital waterway.

Oil exports through the strait have recovered significantly from earlier wartime disruptions, although shipping costs, insurance rates and damage to regional energy infrastructure have continued to keep pressure on global energy prices. The economic consequences of the conflict have increasingly become a domestic political issue in the United States ahead of November’s midterm elections.

The war is costing the United States approximately $3 billion per month, while higher fuel and energy costs have provided Democrats with an issue to use against Trump and Republican candidates in closely contested races that could determine control of Congress.

Vance has been campaigning on behalf of Republican candidates and has urged voters not to allow dissatisfaction over the war to drive them away from the GOP. His Alaska trip included a rally for Republican Sen. Dan Sullivan, who is facing a competitive reelection challenge from Democrat Mary Peltola.

Vance spent much of his appearance in Alaska discussing affordability and energy costs, particularly significant issues in a state where geographic isolation raises consumer prices and oil and gas production remain major components of the economy.

During the rally, Sullivan nearly introduced Vance as president rather than vice president, drawing cheers from the crowd. Vance is widely viewed as a possible Republican presidential candidate in 2028, although he said he has made no decision about seeking the White House.

“I’m inherently a procrastinator,” he said. “I really haven’t thought about it much.”

Trump has separately argued that Iran is already close to capitulating under the combined pressure of American military operations, economic isolation and severe damage to its military capabilities.

Last week, Trump described Iran as “ready to fold up” and predicted that the United States could secure victory shortly after the November midterm elections — or potentially even before Election Day.

Speaking in Texas, Trump said, “We have a war going on with a country that will never have a nuclear weapon and is ready to fold up. We’ll win very easily right now. I believe right after the election we’ll win, but maybe before the election.”

Trump has repeatedly maintained that Iran was on the verge of acquiring a nuclear weapon when hostilities began in late February, arguing that military action was necessary to prevent Tehran from crossing that threshold.

According to Trump, Iran was “three to four weeks away, maybe sooner” from obtaining a nuclear weapon when the war began.

“And if they have a nuclear weapon, the whole game is over..” he said.

The president has warned that Tehran now faces a stark choice as negotiations continue, saying the conflict will end “one way or the other…either they’ll do something very proper and smart or they won’t be around very long, which is, you know, frankly, I hate to see that, but they won’t be around very long.”

{Matzav.com}

Lt. Col. Aryeh Amidror, the Gaza Division’s intelligence officer at the time of the Oct. 7 massacre, is denying that he bears professional or command responsibility for the failure to warn of Hamas’s impending invasion, arguing in newly released court documents that providing strategic warning of war was not the responsibility of divisional intelligence.

Amidror’s defense comes amid a bitter battle over the IDF’s decision to end his military career following investigations into the catastrophic intelligence and command failures preceding Oct. 7. His identity was kept from the public for nearly three years before Israel’s Supreme Court ruled last week that his name could be published.

The newly disclosed documents stem from a petition Amidror filed in March 2026 challenging the process to terminate his career service. The proceedings initially remained confidential, and even after his arguments were rejected, the filings continued to be covered by a gag order. Their release now provides the fullest picture yet of Amidror’s effort to contest the conclusions reached by the military about his conduct.

Amidror, the son of Maj. Gen. (res.) Yaakov Amidror, a former Israeli national security adviser, served as the Gaza Division intelligence officer during the period leading up to the Hamas invasion and on the morning of Oct. 7 itself. He had also previously served as head of the division’s targets branch, giving him years of experience with Gaza and its intelligence picture.

One of the central issues in the case concerns the warnings of a female noncommissioned officer in the IDF’s elite Unit 8200, identified publicly only as “Vav,” who studied Hamas training exercises in the months before the massacre and warned that they could reflect preparations for an actual invasion.

Amidror argues that far from ignoring the issue, it was he who directed that Hamas’s exercises be studied in the first place.

“Upon assuming my position as Gaza Division intelligence officer, I instructed a certain body within Unit 8200 to find Hamas training exercises in order to assess the enemy’s tactical capabilities,” the documents state. According to Amidror, “following an instruction given by the petitioner and at the direction of her commanders, the NCO found the exercise.”

The court papers include correspondence between Amidror and the NCO as their disagreement over the meaning of the Hamas exercises developed.

“To be clear, the purpose of my email was not to bring the assessment down but to raise it. In any event, I don’t think this is a point of ‘absolute and unequivocal disagreement,’ because clearly, as more material is distributed, the area of agreement will grow. We are at the beginning of the process.”

Amidror points to that correspondence as evidence that he did not simply dismiss the NCO’s work. He also says he initiated a discussion “with the aim of challenging the prevailing concept and examining the division’s underlying assumptions regarding the possibility that Hamas had the capability and intention to carry out a single or large-scale raid.”

According to Amidror, a summary of that discussion was circulated as high as the office of the IDF chief of staff, showing that he was actively attempting “to undermine and challenge the underlying assumptions.” He contends that those efforts were not properly considered when military leaders decided to remove him from service.

Other evidence presented in the investigations, however, has painted a sharply different picture of his handling of the warnings. Amidror has previously been reported to have dismissed the Hamas mass-invasion scenario contained in the so-called “Jericho Wall” plan as a “completely imaginary scenario,” despite warnings from Unit 8200 and Gaza border observers.

The Jericho Wall document described with remarkable detail a Hamas assault involving rocket fire, drones, the breaching of Israel’s border defenses and large numbers of terrorists pouring into Israeli communities and military bases — elements that would ultimately materialize on the morning of Oct. 7.

The newly released court material also exposes what the IDF views as significant weaknesses in Amidror’s argument that he meaningfully challenged the prevailing conception. The Unit 8200 NCO whose work was at the center of the issue was not invited to the discussion and was not given the opportunity to personally present her assessment.

The Gaza Division commander was also not immediately briefed about the intelligence developments, while the discussion on the issue was scheduled for after the holidays. Amidror himself acknowledges the timing in his petition, and the delay has become a key point in the dispute over whether his actions amounted to a meaningful real-time challenge to the prevailing assessment of Hamas’s intentions.

The most consequential argument in Amidror’s filing goes considerably further. He rejects the IDF’s contention that the failure to provide adequate warning falls within his professional responsibility at all.

“The petitioner denies the claim that he failed professionally or bears command or professional responsibility for the failure to provide a warning of war,” the filing states.

It then declares: “The mission of providing a warning of war is not the responsibility of division intelligence.”

The IDF emphatically rejects that interpretation of the job Amidror held.

In its response to his petition, the military describes the Gaza Division intelligence officer’s responsibilities in broad terms: “The Gaza Division intelligence officer leads all intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination efforts in the sector – management of the intelligence picture, warning, collection and research, and command advisory.”

The IDF’s assessment of Amidror’s performance is severe. Military investigators concluded that the failures were not limited to a single judgment made in the hours immediately before the massacre, but included his handling of intelligence during the period leading up to the attack.

The military states that it identified “a series of professional errors and failures in the petitioner’s conduct on the night preceding October 7, as well as beforehand, in assessing the security risk posed by the Hamas terrorist organization.”

The IDF further rejected Amidror’s attempt to separate his personal conduct from his command responsibility for the intelligence apparatus operating beneath him.

“The petitioner bears personal responsibility for the failures identified in his conduct – in the manner in which he exercised his judgment, the degree of oversight he maintained, and the level of professionalism he demonstrated in his position. Command responsibility means the commander’s responsibility for what occurs in the unit under his authority.”

The disciplinary process against Amidror followed a broader examination of the IDF’s internal Oct. 7 investigations by an expert team headed by Maj. Gen. (res.) Sami Turgeman. The review concluded, among other things, that the Gaza Division had failed to sufficiently engage with the Jericho Wall invasion plan from both an intelligence and operational standpoint.

On Nov. 23, 2025, the IDF chief of staff determined that a series of senior commanders bore command responsibility for failures connected to Oct. 7 and ordered command measures against several officers, including Amidror. A subsequent recommendation from the deputy chief of staff called for ending Amidror’s career-service commitment.

Amidror challenged that process in court, describing his treatment as discriminatory, selective and arbitrary. The administrative court ultimately rejected his petition and allowed the IDF process to proceed. In September, the military formally announced that his career service would be terminated.

The IDF also argued that Amidror’s legal theory could have ramifications far beyond his individual case. Military commanders, it said, must retain the ability to impose command consequences even when an officer’s actions do not necessarily amount to individual legal wrongdoing.

If courts were to restrict command sanctions solely to questions of individual legal liability, the IDF warned, it could severely constrain the chief of staff’s authority to hold commanders accountable for failures occurring under their leadership.

“This result must not be permitted,” the military wrote.

Amidror, meanwhile, maintains that he has been singled out to bear consequences for a failure that extended throughout Israel’s intelligence and military leadership.

“The petitioner is the only commander in the IDF who is paying a real price, in the form of the loss of his rights, for the failures of the military and the state concerning intelligence and warnings about the intentions of the Hamas terrorist organization,” he argued.

His filing points to senior figures who held key positions on Oct. 7, including commanders in Southern Command, the Operations Directorate, the Gaza Division and Unit 8200. Amidror argues that those officers were able to complete their service and leave the IDF while preserving their pension and other benefits, while the termination of his career service leaves him facing a different financial and professional outcome.

Amidror also fought to keep his identity from being made public, but that battle ended last week when the Supreme Court lifted the publication restriction. The court cited the absence of a security reason to continue concealing his name, the fact that his identity had already circulated publicly and the strong public interest in identifying a senior intelligence officer whom the IDF had held responsible for failures connected to Oct. 7.

With the gag order lifted, Amidror’s defense is now playing out publicly for the first time, exposing a fundamental clash over one of the central questions left by the Oct. 7 catastrophe: where responsibility for recognizing Hamas’s intentions and providing a warning ultimately rested — and who should personally pay the price for failing to do so.

{Matzav.com}

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