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The Flydubai co-pilot accused of trying to seize control of Flight FZ1073 had allegedly been planning a mass-casualty terrorist attack against Israel even before he joined the airline, with investigators now saying his intended targets included Ben Gurion Airport and possibly the Azrieli Towers in Tel Aviv.

New details emerging from the interrogation of 29-year-old Omani national Hamam al-Hammami indicate that his alleged objective was far more elaborate than simply bringing down the aircraft. Israeli officials say he intended to kill or incapacitate Captain Smit Machchhar, continue flying toward Israel as though nothing had happened, receive normal clearance to approach Ben Gurion Airport and then, at the last possible moment, deliberately crash the jet into the airport terminal or another target.

Investigators believe that explains why al-Hammami waited until the aircraft was over Jordan before launching his attack. By remaining on the normal flight path toward Israel, he apparently hoped to avoid setting off alarms that could have resulted in Israeli fighter jets intercepting the aircraft before it reached its target.

Under the alleged plan, the plane would have continued its descent toward Ben Gurion as though it were making an ordinary landing. Only during the final moments of the approach, when authorities would have had virtually no time to react, would al-Hammami have diverted the aircraft toward the terminal or another structure at the airport.

Additional reports indicate that al-Hammami had deliberately sought employment with an airline serving Israel and had begun planning the attack before Flydubai hired him.

“I searched and checked which airlines fly to Tel Aviv and therefore I chose Flydubai. I tried to be hired by all the companies. I planned the attack before I was hired,” he reportedly told his interrogators.

Other accounts of the interrogation quoted al-Hammami as telling investigators, “The dream was to crash into Ben-Gurion Airport.”

Investigators are also examining evidence that al-Hammami had previously used his employment with Flydubai to gather information about Ben Gurion Airport. He reportedly flew into Israel on earlier occasions, including a visit in June during which authorities now suspect he may have conducted surveillance and studied the airport as part of his preparations.

According to Israeli media reports, al-Hammami may even have come close to carrying out his plan months before the September 30 attack. He allegedly operated another flight to Israel in July with the intention of crashing it, but abandoned the plan because of a personal attachment he had developed to one of the crew members.

A separate line of the investigation suggests that Ben Gurion Airport was not the only potential target. A senior Emirati official reportedly said investigators are examining evidence that al-Hammami also considered carrying out a September 11-style attack against the Azrieli Towers in Tel Aviv.

Under that scenario, he allegedly intended to take complete control of the Boeing 737 MAX and fly it into one of the high-rise towers in the heart of Tel Aviv, close to the Kirya military headquarters. Investigators are examining whether the Azrieli Towers were an alternative target or part of an evolving attack plan.

The emerging evidence has added another dimension to earlier reports that Israeli investigators currently believe al-Hammami most likely acted as a lone wolf. While authorities continue examining whether he had assistance or connections to an outside terrorist organization or foreign government, the latest information suggests that the attack itself may have been planned over a lengthy period rather than being a spontaneous act aboard the aircraft.

The plot was ultimately thwarted because Machchhar, despite being seriously wounded, managed to unlock the cockpit door. Passengers and crew members were then able to enter the cockpit and overpower al-Hammami before he could regain control.

Emirati investigators have determined that al-Hammami attacked Machchhar with the emergency crash axe kept inside the cockpit. The aircraft plunged more than 16,000 feet during the struggle before reserve pilots traveling aboard the flight were able to stabilize it and divert to Tabuk, Saudi Arabia.

The investigation into the alleged plot has become an international effort. Mossad personnel and Israeli aviation experts are reportedly participating in the investigation in Abu Dhabi alongside Emirati authorities, with Saudi and Omani intelligence officials and at least two representatives of U.S. intelligence agencies also involved.

Investigators are now attempting to reconstruct al-Hammami’s movements, communications and preparations before the attack, including his previous employment and the circumstances under which he was allowed to become a Flydubai pilot despite earlier concerns about his extremist views.

Al-Hammami previously entered pilot training with Oman Air but was removed from flying duties after authorities reportedly discovered evidence of extremist activity and radical material. He was transferred to an administrative position and later left the airline.

After his time with Oman Air, al-Hammami reportedly spent time in Morocco and Syria before eventually moving to Dubai and joining Flydubai. Other reports indicate that he had previously trained with Royal Air Maroc but was not ultimately hired as a pilot by the Moroccan carrier.

His background has also drawn the attention of Australian counterterrorism authorities because al-Hammami studied in Melbourne approximately a decade ago. Investigators there are examining reports that he visited radical mosques and accessed extremist material online during his years in Australia.

The alleged terrorist’s history has become a central issue in the investigation because multiple warning signs appear to have existed before he ever entered a Flydubai cockpit. Oman Air had reportedly removed him from flying because of radicalization concerns, yet he was subsequently able to secure a flying position with Flydubai without the airline obtaining his full background from Omani authorities.

Questions have also intensified over how al-Hammami, an Omani national, was permitted to repeatedly serve aboard flights to Israel when Oman does not maintain diplomatic relations with Israel. The controversy has already prompted Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to order a comprehensive investigation into Israel’s procedures for screening foreign airlines and their crews.

The new interrogation details indicate that this apparent security failure may have been precisely what al-Hammami intended to exploit. Rather than finding himself assigned by chance to a Tel Aviv route, he allegedly sought out Flydubai because it could provide him with access to Israel and then used his position as a commercial pilot to prepare for an attack from inside the cockpit.

What began over Jordan on September 30, according to investigators, was therefore allegedly the final stage of a plan that had been developing long before Flight FZ1073 left Dubai — one intended to allow an apparently routine passenger jet to approach Ben Gurion Airport normally before being turned into a weapon in the final seconds of its flight.

{Matzav.com}

Israeli investigators currently believe that the Flydubai co-pilot who allegedly tried to crash Flight FZ1073 while it was en route from Dubai to Tel Aviv most likely acted alone, although the investigation remains ongoing and authorities have not ruled out the possibility that he had connections to a terrorist organization, foreign government or other outside actors.

The preliminary Israeli assessment represents an important development in the investigation, particularly after President Trump raised the possibility of Iranian involvement and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said authorities were examining whether the attacker had been sent by someone else. Investigators stressed that the lone-wolf assessment is preliminary and that all avenues remain under examination.

The attack occurred Wednesday aboard Flight FZ1073 as the Boeing 737 MAX traveled from Dubai toward Tel Aviv with 172 people aboard. According to Israeli and Emirati officials, the co-pilot attacked Captain Smit Machchhar inside the cockpit and attempted to send the aircraft crashing toward the ground.

Emirati authorities have since disclosed that the weapon was not a knife, as initially reported, but the emergency crash axe kept inside the cockpit. The UAE attorney general has formally described what occurred aboard the aircraft as an attempted terrorist act.

Despite being wounded in the attack, Machchhar managed to fight off the co-pilot long enough to unlock the cockpit door. Israeli passengers and Flydubai crew members then rushed in and subdued the attacker, while two off-duty pilots traveling aboard the flight helped regain control of the aircraft and divert it to Tabuk, Saudi Arabia, for an emergency landing.

Machchhar has since described the moment the attack began, saying that the co-pilot had been praying shortly beforehand. “While he was praying, out of respect, I was just looking at the front and not at the back. And suddenly there was a big blow to the back of my head. My first thought was that there was a catastrophic damage to the aircraft. After that, the blows kept coming, one after another. And that’s when I realized that it’s not the aircraft, it’s the other guy who was in the cockpit with me.”

The suspect was taken into custody after the emergency landing and initially questioned by Saudi authorities. He was subsequently transferred to the United Arab Emirates, where he is undergoing additional interrogation. Israeli representatives have traveled to the UAE to participate in the investigation.

President Trump on Thursday publicly raised the possibility that the attacker had ties to Iran, while making clear that the investigation had not been completed.

“We’re working on it right now,” Trump said. “They’re being very open with us. I would say the answer, based on what I’m hearing, is yes. But we’re working on it right now.”

Netanyahu, however, was more cautious when initially discussing the attack with CBS News, saying that investigators had not yet determined precisely what motivated the co-pilot.

“I don’t think it was a hijacking,” Netanyahu told CBS Evening News anchor Tony Dokoupil, adding, “I think it looks like a suicide attempt.”

Netanyahu subsequently said that information gathered during the investigation indicated that the attacker had undergone Islamist radicalization and was suicidal. According to Netanyahu and witnesses aboard the aircraft, after the co-pilot was restrained, he repeatedly demanded that those around him kill him.

Israeli dentist Dr. Shota Musaev, who treated Machchhar after the cockpit was opened, said the subdued co-pilot repeatedly asked to be killed. “After two minutes he – he said to me, kill me. Kill me. And said to Yanif (ph), kill – kill me, sometimes. That’s – that’s it.” Asked whether the attacker had said it repeatedly, Musaev replied, “Yes. Yes, yes.”

Although authorities have not formally released the co-pilot’s identity, multiple sources familiar with the investigation have identified him as Hamam al Hamami, an Omani national believed to be 29 years old.

Investigators have uncovered a series of apparent warning signs in al Hamami’s background. He previously entered pilot training with Oman Air, but Omani government surveillance reportedly found that he had been visiting extremist websites. Oman Air subsequently removed him from flying duties and transferred him to an office position.

One source familiar with his employment history said al Hamami later resigned from Oman Air after being placed on desk duty and left the airline around 2024. Reports that initially said he had been fired have subsequently been corrected to indicate that he resigned.

Sources also said that al Hamami at one point posted a video showing El Al aircraft at an airport in Dubai. The video reportedly concluded with an image of Ayman al-Zawahiri, the Al Qaeda leader who was killed in a U.S. drone strike in 2022.

After leaving Oman Air, al Hamami moved to Dubai and was hired by Flydubai. Sources familiar with the investigation said Flydubai did not contact the Omani government to vet his background before employing him.

Questions about his background have now spread well beyond Oman and the UAE. Australian counterterrorism authorities are investigating al Hamami’s connections to Australia, where he reportedly studied at RMIT University in Melbourne approximately a decade ago. Australian federal and state police, along with intelligence officials, are participating in that investigation.

Reports have alleged that while living in Australia, al Hamami visited radical mosques and accessed extremist material online. Investigators are examining whether his radicalization began years before he joined Flydubai and whether he developed any connections during his time abroad.

Sources describe al Hamami as an Omani citizen who was born outside Oman and spent much of his life in other countries. His father is reportedly Omani and his mother Syrian. The Omani government has not publicly confirmed his citizenship.

Investigators have also raised the possibility that al Hamami holds dual citizenship. That question has become particularly significant because Oman does not have diplomatic relations with Israel, raising questions about how an Omani citizen was cleared to serve as a crew member on repeated flights to Tel Aviv.

The incident has triggered a much broader investigation inside Israel into how foreign flight crews are vetted. Netanyahu on Sunday ordered a comprehensive review of security procedures governing foreign civilian flights arriving in Israel after revelations that Israeli authorities had received a list of the Flydubai flight’s crew members, reportedly including al Hamami’s name and nationality, before the aircraft departed Dubai.

The revelation has intensified questions over why al Hamami was not flagged despite his Omani nationality and his reported history of extremist activity. Israeli government agencies have traded claims over which body bore responsibility for examining foreign crews and whether the relevant intelligence was available to those responsible for aviation security.

For now, however, Israeli investigators reportedly believe the attack was most likely carried out by al Hamami on his own. That assessment has not closed the investigation into possible outside ties, and authorities in Israel, the UAE and other countries continue examining his communications, movements, employment history and years of alleged radical activity to determine whether anyone helped him prepare for the attempted attack.

{Matzav.com}

Former Knesset member Yehuda Glick has been barred by police from entering Har Habayis for six months after he recited a Mi Shebeirach there for Neria Leiter, the Israeli reservist who was critically wounded in the terrorist ramming attack at the Maccabim checkpoint on Route 443.

The order was signed by Yerushalayim District Police Commander Avshalom Peled and prohibits Glick from entering Har Habayis or its approaches from September 24, 2026, through March 24, 2027.

Police said the order was issued under Peled’s authority because it was necessary to “prevent severe harm to life or property.”

The incident that prompted the order occurred when Glick went onto Har Habayis and audibly recited a Mi Shebeirach for Neria Dov ben Chana, the son of Israeli Ambassador to the United States Yechiel Leiter. Leiter was critically wounded when a terrorist drove a vehicle into personnel at the Maccabim checkpoint.

It should be noted that the Gedolei Yisroel and leading poskim throughout the generations have ruled that it is assur for Jews to ascend Har Habayis because of the severe halachic issues involved, including the possibility of entering areas forbidden due to tumah. Glick has for decades advocated Jewish ascension to and prayer on Har Habayis, a position rejected by the leading poskim of the chareidi world.

According to reports in the Israeli media, police determined that Glick had violated the regulations governing conduct at the site by reciting the prayer aloud. He was subsequently summoned for a hearing, after which Peled signed the six-month exclusion order.

Glick responded furiously to the decision, insisting that he has adhered to police requirements during his decades of visits to the site.

“I’ve been ascending the Temple Mount for 40 years. I always follow the guidelines. The Temple Mount police are persecuting me with evil, with malice, for no wrong done to me,” he wrote.

Glick said the latest decision marks the third consecutive year that police have barred him from Har Habayis shortly before Sukkos, a period during which he has traditionally led groups and tours at the site.

He also directed criticism at National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, saying that despite Ben-Gvir’s own strong advocacy for expanded Jewish access to Har Habayis, the repeated restrictions against Glick have continued while Ben-Gvir has been responsible for the police.

The latest confrontation is part of a lengthy history between Glick and police over his activities on Har Habayis. He has repeatedly faced restrictions and exclusion orders over the years in connection with prayer and other activity at the site.

In one earlier case, a Yerushalayim Magistrate’s Court found that Glick had been wrongfully barred from Har Habayis between 2011 and 2013 after footage showed him praying there. The court initially awarded him substantial damages, although subsequent appeals reversed the compensation award.

Glick also survived an assassination attempt in Yerushalayim in October 2014, when he was shot multiple times at close range after attending a conference devoted to Jewish prayer rights on Har Habayis. He was critically wounded but ultimately recovered.

Referring to that assassination attempt while describing his anger over the latest police action, Glick wrote, “These people hurt me many times more than the man who tried to assassinate me hurt me. Really, how much evil can I take?”

Despite the six-month ban, Glick said he has no intention of allowing the decision to end his activism.

“And after all this, I lift my hands to the higher G-d and commit that they won’t manage to break me. I hope I can hold on.”

Israeli Prime Minister Binyomin Netanyahu has ordered a comprehensive review of Israel’s security system for foreign civilian flights after the attempted attack aboard Flydubai Flight FZ1073 exposed what reports describe as years of ignored warnings, unclear lines of responsibility, intelligence gaps and inadequate screening of foreign air crews.

Netanyahu instructed National Security Council Director Shmuel Ben Ezra to appoint an examiner to investigate the entire foreign-aviation security framework, including how an Omani co-pilot who had previously raised extremism concerns abroad was able to repeatedly fly the Dubai-Tel Aviv route before allegedly trying to crash a plane carrying more than 170 passengers and crew.

The growing controversy extends far beyond the events aboard the aircraft. Reports published since the attack describe a security structure in which government ministries and intelligence agencies had warned one another for years about weaknesses in the system, yet key decisions remained unimplemented and responsibility for screening foreign crews was never clearly resolved.

The alleged attacker, identified in multiple reports as Omani national Hammam al-Hammami, had reportedly been prohibited from flying in Oman because of concerns about radicalization. He nevertheless later joined Flydubai and was assigned to flights serving Israel, despite Oman having no diplomatic relations with the Jewish state. Israeli authorities were reportedly unaware of his earlier history.

The questions surrounding his background have widened further. Australian counterterrorism authorities are now examining al-Hammami’s ties to Australia, where he studied roughly a decade ago. Australian intelligence services had reportedly maintained a file on him, and he had allegedly visited radical mosques and accessed extremist websites while living there.

He also trained with Royal Air Maroc before the Moroccan carrier declined to employ him. The combination of warnings and concerns emerging from several countries has intensified scrutiny of how he passed through Flydubai’s hiring and vetting process and, separately, how Israeli authorities failed to identify him as a potential threat before he flew repeatedly to Ben Gurion Airport.

An internal National Security Council document reported by Galei Tzahal showed that concerns over foreign-flight security long predated the Flydubai incident. According to the report, responsibility had been placed on the Transportation Ministry even though professionals inside the ministry warned that they did not possess the capabilities, authority or resources needed to perform the task properly.

The NSC itself reportedly warned in March 2025 that the Transportation Ministry was not carrying out the responsibilities assigned to it under an earlier government decision. Despite those warnings, the underlying arrangement remained in place.

A central part of the controversy concerns Israel’s National Passenger Data Analysis Center, which receives information about passengers and crews arriving aboard foreign airlines. The system can help authorities identify individuals whose citizenship, background or other information may require additional examination.

According to reports, the Transportation Ministry was entitled to make use of information from the system as part of its aviation-security responsibilities but never put such access into operation. The ministry, however, disputes the suggestion that it is responsible for conducting intelligence checks on individual foreign pilots.

The timing of crew information has also come under scrutiny. Channel 13 reported that airlines sometimes transmit crew details only shortly before departure and, in some instances, as late as 15 minutes after takeoff. That could leave Israeli security bodies learning about a potentially problematic crew member only after the aircraft is already airborne and heading toward Israel.

A government source said the timing is consistent with common international aviation practices and noted that no Israeli government agency had previously demanded a different procedure. Those practices are now being reconsidered in the wake of the Flydubai attack.

Recordings of a discussion between senior Transportation and Interior Ministry officials, aired by Channel 12, further illustrated the confusion. A Transportation Ministry representative reportedly asked how Israel would know that a crew member traveling on an Emirati passport also held Omani citizenship. An Interior Ministry official responded that crews were not screened to that degree and acknowledged that passenger and crew information could arrive only after a flight had taken off.

The Interior Ministry official later said that the information it received was passed along to the appropriate security agencies, including the Shin Bet and Mossad.

Adding another layer to the dispute, regional officials have said that the UAE had in fact provided Israel with the Flydubai crew and passenger details, including names and nationalities, before the flight. The Transportation Ministry maintains that the crew list was not given directly to it, while reports indicate that other Israeli government and security bodies had access to the information.

The case has therefore become as much a dispute over responsibility as one over missing information: who received the crew data, which agencies were expected to examine it, who was supposed to flag a problematic nationality or background, and whether anyone had access to the intelligence necessary to recognize the threat.

Al-Hammami may not have been the first foreign crew member from a country without diplomatic relations with Israel to reach Ben Gurion Airport. Reports indicate that pilots or air crew holding Iranian, Lebanese, Pakistani, Syrian and other citizenships have arrived in Israel in previous years, despite regulations intended to restrict such cases.

Channel 13 reported official figures showing that 10 Omani citizens entered Israel in 2022, 29 in 2023, nine in 2024 and 11 in 2025, with additional entries recorded during 2026. Oman is not formally classified by Israel as an enemy state, but the countries do not maintain diplomatic relations, and authorities believe that at least some of those entries may have involved airline personnel.

Israel has now tightened its rules. Under new instructions issued to foreign carriers, crew members who hold citizenship or dual citizenship in countries that do not maintain diplomatic relations with Israel are barred from serving aboard Israel-bound flights. The new directive reportedly covers citizens of 27 countries.

The unanswered questions reach back several years. In June 2023, the NSC convened a meeting with representatives of the Shin Bet and Mossad to discuss how intelligence should be transferred to civilian bodies responsible for aviation security.

Transportation Ministry representatives reportedly said at the meeting that although the ministry bore responsibility for securing foreign flights, it was not receiving sufficient intelligence to carry out that mission effectively. The meeting concluded with a decision that Mossad would increase the intelligence information passed to the ministry.

According to the reports, that decision was never implemented.

The Shin Bet had separately warned over the years about weaknesses in the tracking of foreign flight crews and the verification of passenger identities. Sources cited in Israeli media said the agency had recommended transferring responsibility for oversight of foreign flights and crew lists to the Israel Airports Authority.

The emerging picture is therefore one of warnings coming from multiple directions without producing a lasting solution. Transportation Ministry professionals complained that they lacked intelligence. Security agencies identified weaknesses in the screening system. Senior government officials were aware that responsibility remained disputed. Yet the structural problems were allowed to remain unresolved.

Questions have also emerged over the staffing of the Transportation Ministry’s Aviation Security, Emergency and Cyber Division, whose broad portfolio includes security responsibilities for multiple forms of transportation.

According to figures reported by Ynet, eight employees left the division between 2022 and 2025. The number of official positions reportedly declined from 21 to 19, six of them designated as part-time positions for students and senior citizens, while at least two senior positions remained vacant without budget allocations.

Despite responsibility for security and emergency systems involving air, maritime and land transportation, the unit reportedly operates with only about 10 permanent full-time employees.

Former ministry officials have said that efforts were made for years to strengthen the aviation-security operations center or transfer some of its responsibilities to the Shin Bet or Mossad. Those initiatives were never carried through.

Dani Shneer, a former senior director of the Security Division and former Transportation Ministry chief security officer, has said that the division was assigned responsibility for examining foreign flight crews under a government decision dating to 2003. Airlines were required to provide crew information in connection with permission to land in Israel.

Shneer has argued that the system functioned effectively in earlier years but that its responsibilities have since become too extensive for a relatively small government unit. He believes the function should be transferred to a national security organization.

The employment arrangements of officials involved in the system have also drawn attention. Channel 12 reported that Dvir Rubinstein, identified as the manager of the Transportation Ministry’s aviation-security operations center, works through an outsourced arrangement rather than as a government employee and also holds other jobs.

The Transportation Ministry confirmed that arrangement, saying Rubinstein’s additional employment had received legal approval and was conducted outside his government working hours.

Channel 12 later reported that Rubinstein had also performed paid private consulting and training work for foreign airlines, including Flydubai and Emirates, adding another issue now drawing scrutiny as officials examine the security structure surrounding foreign carriers.

Haaretz separately reported that Aviation Security Division chief Avi Cohen also works as a standby security officer in an overseas aviation-security system and receives separate compensation for that position. The Transportation Ministry said the outside role had been authorized when Cohen assumed his post in 2018.

The dispute over who should be responsible for foreign-flight security has been continuing for years. A cabinet decision in July 2021 addressed the allocation of responsibilities, and the matter subsequently appeared in a confidential State Comptroller report in May 2024.

A working group was later formed with representatives of the National Security Council, Transportation Ministry, Israel Airports Authority, Shin Bet, Mossad and Finance Ministry in an effort to resolve the matter.

According to Galei Tzahal, professional officials in the Transportation Ministry’s Security Division resisted assuming the responsibility because they believed they lacked the necessary tools. Nevertheless, Netanyahu decided in mid-2025 that the responsibility would remain with the Transportation Ministry.

The report said that even after that decision, the ministry’s Security Division did not approach the Shin Bet or Mossad to request assistance in carrying out security screening or the vetting of foreign passengers and crew members.

The Transportation Ministry has pushed back strongly against much of the criticism, arguing that some of the reports blur important distinctions between regularly scheduled foreign flights and charter operations.

The ministry also rejects the premise that assigning it responsibility for aviation security makes it responsible for intelligence investigations of every foreign pilot or crew member.

“The Transportation Ministry is not an intelligence body, and it does not have the tools to conduct intelligence background checks for crew members and passengers,” the ministry said.

According to the ministry, its procedures were approved by the NSC and Israel’s security organizations and are built around security measures undertaken in the country from which the flight originates, commitments made by the airline itself, and inspections performed by the ministry’s security division.

In the case of Flydubai, the ministry said the airline had been given explicit instructions requiring background checks on its personnel and had provided written confirmation that nationality restrictions were incorporated into its crew-assignment system. The ministry maintains that it never received the specific crew list for Flight FZ1073.

Those claims are now being tested against evidence from other agencies and foreign governments as investigators reconstruct what information existed, when Israel received it and who was responsible for acting on it.

The attack itself demonstrated the potential cost of those failures. During the September 30 flight from Dubai to Tel Aviv, al-Hammami allegedly attacked Captain Smit Machchhar with an emergency crash axe and attempted to seize control of the aircraft. The Boeing 737 MAX plunged more than 16,000 feet in just over 30 seconds during its most severe descent.

Despite being seriously wounded, Machchhar managed to open the cockpit door, allowing passengers and crew to overpower the co-pilot. A reserve Flydubai pilot traveling aboard the plane then helped regain control, and the aircraft eventually landed safely in Tabuk, Saudi Arabia.

UAE prosecutors have officially characterized the incident as a terrorist attack. Al-Hammami remains under investigation in the UAE, while authorities seek to determine his motive, whether he acted alone and whether anyone else helped plan or direct the attack.

The National Security Council examiner appointed under Netanyahu’s directive will now be expected to trace the failures across the entire chain: old warnings, unimplemented decisions, intelligence-sharing shortcomings, delayed crew information, manpower deficiencies and the longstanding argument over which agency was ultimately supposed to protect foreign flights entering Israel.

At the center of the review will be one overriding question: how a co-pilot who had reportedly already drawn the attention of authorities overseas, had been barred from flying over extremism concerns and was a citizen of a country without diplomatic relations with Israel was able to repeatedly enter the cockpit of aircraft bound for Tel Aviv — until one of those flights nearly ended in catastrophe.

The U.S. Air Force has withdrawn all of its B-1 bombers from RAF Fairford in England and returned them to the United States as British authorities investigate a suspected terrorist plot targeting the strategically important base, including possible links to Iran.

The Pentagon confirmed Sunday that the aircraft previously deployed to RAF Fairford, which has served as a major staging point for American bomber operations against Iran, had left the installation and returned to their home stations in the United States. Approximately a dozen B-1B Lancer bombers had recently been stationed there.

“US Air Force bombers routinely operate around the world to support global force readiness and operational requirements,” a department official told Fox News Digital.

The official said the Pentagon had been unable to discuss the aircraft movements while they were underway because of operational security concerns, but could now confirm that the bombers had been redeployed to the United States.

“The Airmen that operate America’s bomber force, including B-1s, B-2s, and B-52s, remain ready to deliver precision global strike capabilities – including through operations that launch and recover from the continental United States – anywhere, anytime,” the official added. Another U.S. official confirmed that approximately 12 B-1 bombers had been withdrawn.

The withdrawal came amid a widening British counterterrorism investigation into suspicious activity near RAF Fairford, a Gloucestershire base roughly 90 miles west of London that has played an important role in U.S. military operations during the war with Iran.

According to The Wall Street Journal, U.S. military commanders had received new warnings concerning a suspected Iran-backed plot against the installation before the bombers were removed. American officials reportedly believe investigators are examining whether an Iran-linked element of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps recruited British nationals to carry out an attack. Iran has denied involvement.

The investigation began after police were called to the area near RAF Fairford shortly after midnight on September 27 following reports of suspicious vehicles and masked men. Five British men in their early 20s were arrested near the base, initially on suspicion of explosives offenses and subsequently on suspicion of preparing a terrorist act.

Police searched three white vans associated with the suspects. No explosives were discovered, but authorities said a quantity of gasoline was recovered from the vehicles. Nearby homes were evacuated as bomb-disposal specialists examined the scene.

The five suspects were later released on bail under strict conditions while the counterterrorism investigation continued. Authorities have emphasized that their release does not mean the investigation has ended.

The case took a further turn days later when British counterterrorism officers arrested a sixth suspect, a 25-year-old dual British-Iranian national, in central London on suspicion of preparing terrorist acts. He was subsequently released on bail as investigators continued examining the possibility of foreign-state involvement.

British authorities have said there are indications that Iran may have played a role in the alleged plot, while investigators continue analyzing electronic devices and other evidence in an effort to determine whether the suspects were acting independently or had been recruited or directed by a foreign power.

Tehran has strongly denied any connection to the incident. Iran has, however, previously warned that military installations used to launch attacks against Iranian territory could be regarded as legitimate targets.

RAF Fairford has assumed particular strategic importance during the current conflict because American long-range bombers have operated from the installation during U.S. strikes against Iran. The base has also been used by the United States during previous military operations in the Middle East.

The withdrawal does not mean the U.S. bomber force has lost the ability to conduct long-range missions in the region. American B-1, B-2 and B-52 bombers are capable of launching missions directly from bases in the continental United States, including extremely long-range strike operations supported by aerial refueling.

The bomber redeployment also comes as Washington continues to maintain a substantial military presence in the Middle East. Additional U.S. naval forces are heading toward the region, including the USS Theodore Roosevelt carrier group, as tensions with Iran remain high and President Trump weighs the possibility of further military action.

The Pentagon has not publicly said whether the bombers will eventually return to RAF Fairford or whether their removal is expected to remain in effect for the duration of the terrorism investigation.

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