SIX MONTHS LOST?: Former Harris Adviser Accuses Netanyahu of Blocking Hostage Deal That Could Have Saved Israeli Lives
Phil Gordon, who served as Vice President Kamala Harris’s national security adviser during the Biden administration, has accused Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu of delaying a hostage-release agreement with Hamas by six months in 2024, alleging that the Israeli leader introduced new demands that prevented an earlier deal and left Israeli captives in Gaza, where several were subsequently murdered.
In a lengthy statement published today, Gordon claimed that Hamas had accepted the basic framework of an American-backed agreement in July 2024, only for Netanyahu to insist on additional conditions that made an agreement impossible until January 2025.
Gordon’s allegations follow explosive claims made earlier this week by Netanyahu’s former military secretary, Avi Gil, who accused the prime minister of passing up opportunities to secure the release of hostages because of political considerations.
The former American official argued that an agreement could have been reached months earlier if Netanyahu had accepted the framework being negotiated at the time, and suggested that the delay contributed to the deaths of Israeli hostages who might otherwise have returned home alive.
Gordon’s intervention also exposed disagreements among senior officials who served in the Biden administration over responsibility for the prolonged negotiations and whether Washington should have applied greater pressure on Israel to end the fighting.
The immediate trigger for Gordon’s comments was the publication of a new book by Brett McGurk, a senior Biden administration Middle East adviser who played a central role in negotiating the eventual hostage agreement.
Gordon accused Netanyahu’s supporters of selectively using McGurk’s account to defend the prime minister’s wartime decisions.
“Netanyahu supporters seem to be taking advantage of Brett McGurk’s book and interviews to claim vindication for Netanyahu’s conduct of the war in Gaza,” Gordon wrote on X.
“But while Brett’s front-row account is valuable, that doesn’t mean it is definitive or its perspectives widely shared — including among former members of the Biden administration,” he continued.
Gordon pointed specifically to a July 4, 2024, telephone conversation between President Joe Biden and Netanyahu, which he said represented a critical moment in the negotiations.
According to Gordon, Hamas had finally agreed to the central framework of a proposed exchange, abandoning its previous insistence that Israel commit to a permanent ceasefire before any hostages were released.
“Brett tells the story of the Biden phone call after [Israel’s accidental strike on a convoy for World Central Kitchen], but not the story of how Biden called Netanyahu on July 4, 2024, to press him to conclude the hostage deal after Hamas had finally accepted the basic framework, dropping its demand that Israel commit to a permanent ceasefire before any hostages were released,” Gordon wrote.
He alleged that Netanyahu responded by introducing additional Israeli conditions, despite objections from senior Israeli security officials.
“Netanyahu instead added so many of his own conditions — against the advice of his own security chiefs — that the deal became impossible for another six months, during which nearly 9,000 more Palestinians were killed and more Israeli hostages died, including the six that Hamas executed in August,” Gordon stated.
The six hostages Gordon referenced were Hersh Goldberg-Polin, Carmel Gat, Eden Yerushalmi, Almog Sarusi, Ori Danino and Alexander Lobanov, whose bodies were recovered from a tunnel in Rafah in late August 2024 after they were murdered by Hamas terrorists.
Gordon’s claim that an earlier agreement could have saved their lives is an assessment of what might have happened had negotiations succeeded in July, rather than an established finding about the outcome of a proposed agreement.
Gordon identified two specific Israeli demands that he said were responsible for preventing an agreement during the summer of 2024.
The first involved Netanyahu’s insistence that Israeli forces remain along the Philadelphi Corridor, the narrow strip of territory running along Gaza’s border with Egypt. Israel had taken control of the corridor during its military offensive in Rafah, after the original hostage agreement framework had been presented.
Netanyahu argued at the time that maintaining control of the corridor was essential to preventing Hamas from rebuilding its military capabilities through weapons smuggling from Egypt.
The second demand concerned the Netzarim Corridor, an Israeli-controlled route dividing northern and southern Gaza. Netanyahu wanted a mechanism to screen Palestinians returning to northern Gaza to prevent armed Hamas terrorists from moving back into areas cleared by the IDF.
Gordon maintained that both requirements complicated the negotiations and were eventually abandoned when Israel agreed to the January 2025 arrangement.
“The Israeli changes included a demand that Israel retain forces along Gaza’s entire border with Egypt, which the IDF had seized only after the original proposal, and a new enforcement mechanism to screen Gazans who were returning home to the north which would have required Israeli troops to remain in central Gaza. Both of those new conditions were dropped in the deal ultimately concluded in January 2025,” Gordon wrote.
His account differs in important respects from the version presented by McGurk, who has emphasized Hamas’s refusal to agree to key provisions during the negotiations.
In an October 4 interview with CBS News, McGurk described the fundamental disagreement between Israel and Hamas as one of the central obstacles to reaching a ceasefire.
He explained that Hamas wanted to retain control of Gaza and secure the release of Palestinian prisoners, while Israel insisted that the terrorist organization could no longer govern the territory following the October 7 massacre.
McGurk said Netanyahu believed sustained military pressure would ultimately force Hamas to accept an agreement favorable to Israel, while Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar calculated that prolonging the conflict would increase international pressure on Israel.
According to McGurk, negotiations continued to encounter major obstacles in December 2024, including Hamas’s refusal to provide an acceptable list of living hostages who would be released under the proposed agreement.
McGurk described a meeting with Netanyahu in December in which the prime minister agreed to a central provision of the deal, contingent on Hamas accepting the proposed list of 33 hostages.
Hamas subsequently indicated that only 12 of those hostages would be released alive, according to McGurk, creating another major obstacle.
The negotiations ultimately produced an agreement in January 2025, shortly before Trump returned to the White House. Representatives of both the outgoing Biden administration and the incoming Trump administration participated in the final diplomatic effort.
McGurk has credited the involvement of Trump’s incoming Middle East envoy, Steve Witkoff, with helping overcome remaining disagreements.
Gordon, however, argued that McGurk’s account should not be treated as the definitive interpretation of the negotiations or of the Biden administration’s handling of the war.
He said many former Biden administration officials believed Washington should have adopted a tougher approach toward Israel and pressed for an earlier conclusion to the fighting.
“I would say most of my former colleagues think that President Biden should have put more pressure on Israel to conduct the war differently and end it sooner,” Gordon wrote.
He added that few of his former colleagues believed Biden’s principal mistake had been publicly disagreeing with Netanyahu.
The accusations emerged just two days after Avi Gil, who served as Netanyahu’s military secretary from July 2021 until May 2024, made a series of allegations concerning the prime minister’s conduct before and after the October 7 massacre.
In an interview broadcast Thursday on Israel’s Channel 12, Gil alleged that Netanyahu had prioritized political considerations when making decisions about hostage negotiations.
Asked whether some hostages who died in captivity could have been brought home alive, and whether surviving hostages could have been released earlier, Gil responded, “We could have.”
Gil suggested that Netanyahu had been influenced by pressure from coalition partners who opposed ceasefire agreements and favored continuing the military campaign against Hamas.
His interview also included allegations concerning warnings Netanyahu received before October 7 and purported attempts by members of the Prime Minister’s Office to alter records relating to the morning of the attack.
Netanyahu’s Likud party strongly rejected Gil’s accusations, describing the interview as “part of the false and politically motivated propaganda campaign against Prime Minister Netanyahu and Likud.”
The prime minister has consistently maintained that Israel’s military operations were necessary to dismantle Hamas’s military and governing capabilities and to increase pressure on the terrorist organization to release the hostages.
He has also argued that agreements must prevent Hamas from rearming and returning to power, warning that concessions without adequate security guarantees could leave Israel vulnerable to another October 7-style attack.
