Revealed: The Document That Led Sinwar to Carry Out the Oct. 7 Massacre
Israeli intelligence officials say a strategic analysis prepared by Hamas’ intelligence apparatus played a central role in the terror group’s decision-making ahead of the October 7, 2023 massacre, influencing the thinking of its now-deceased leaders, Yahya Sinwar and Mohammad Deif.
The document, which was recovered by Israeli forces during combat operations in the Gaza Strip amid the war, was written less than a month before the attack. It was later released in full by the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center.
According to the assessment, Hamas believed Israel had no intention of overthrowing the group’s rule in Gaza. The authors argued that Israeli policy had evolved over time, moving away from decisive military outcomes toward what they described as conflict containment.
The paper stated that “Israel relied for years on a strategy of preemptive strikes, but the strengthening of Hamas and Hezbollah caused it to shift to a pattern of short rounds of limited-intensity fighting.”
The analysis pointed to Israel’s experience in Operation Cast Lead in 2008–2009, asserting that Israel failed to achieve its central aim of dismantling Hamas’ control of Gaza. As a result, the document claimed, Israel adopted imprecise war aims in later confrontations, prioritizing deterrence and conflict management over outright victory and regime change.
The authors also examined the events of Operation Guardian of the Walls in 2021, concluding that Hamas scored what they termed a psychological success by tying the fighting in Gaza to tensions in Jerusalem and Judea and Samaria, while also stirring unrest among Arab citizens of Israel.
In addition, the assessment argued that Israel “failed to implement the ‘war between wars’ policy,” and maintained that the prospect of a multi-front conflict represents the most severe test of Israeli military capacity. For that reason, the document asserted, Israel prefers to avoid simultaneous wars and instead engage adversaries in separate theaters.
Building on these conclusions, the paper asserted that “Israel has not abandoned the idea of a preemptive strike, especially following the failure in Operation Guardian of the Walls, but it is not in a position to build a new deterrence equation. Therefore, it focuses on conflict management, risk management, and neutralizing threats. Thus, the recommendation to Hamas leadership is to prepare for a new opening strike that will trigger a new round of fighting, but also to lead an ‘unexpected’ confrontation that will break the recurring pattern and put Israeli leadership in a state of uncertainty.”
Israeli officials say the document was formally presented to the leadership of Hamas’ military wing. Roughly a month later, the terror group launched the October 7 assault, with investigators assessing that the conclusions and recommendations outlined in the paper were among the factors that shaped the decision to carry out the attack.
{Matzav.com}
