WHO WAS WATCHING? Israel’s Aviation Security System Under Fire After Flydubai Terrorist Slipped Through Despite Years of Warnings
A bitter dispute over responsibility for screening foreign airline crews has erupted in Israel following the attempted Flydubai attack, with the Israeli Transportation Ministry insisting that it does not conduct intelligence background checks on foreign pilots even as government documents reportedly show that the ministry was assigned responsibility for overseeing the security of foreign flights — and had been warned for years that the system was dangerously inadequate.
The questions have become especially urgent after it emerged that the United Arab Emirates transmitted information about the passengers and crew of Flydubai Flight FZ1073 to Israel before the aircraft departed Dubai. The list included the name and nationality of co-pilot Hamam al-Hammami, the 29-year-old Omani accused of attacking Captain Smit Machchhar and attempting to seize control of the Tel Aviv-bound aircraft.
The Israel Tax Authority, which operates the National Center for Passenger Assessment, has confirmed that the passenger and crew information was received from Flydubai. However, the Transportation Ministry says that its own Security Division never received the crew list and does not have access to such lists.
That has left Israeli authorities confronting the central question of how al-Hammami — an Omani national who reportedly had already been flagged over extremist activity during his earlier aviation career — was permitted to repeatedly fly into Israel without being stopped.
The Transportation Ministry has strongly rejected claims that it was supposed to independently investigate the intelligence background of every foreign pilot entering Israeli airspace.
“We are not an intelligence body that checks the intelligence background of foreigners,” a representative of the ministry’s Security Division said. “We have no forces abroad. We have no staff that checks every person there.”
Transportation Minister Miri Regev has similarly argued that intelligence assessments regarding threats are the responsibility of Israel’s security agencies.
“Those who are supposed to say what the threat level is, and whether you can travel to a given destination, are security officials,” Regev said.
The ministry says its system instead requires foreign airlines to screen their own personnel and comply with Israeli restrictions governing who may serve aboard flights entering the country. Flydubai, according to the ministry, had explicitly committed to carrying out the necessary background checks on its crews.
“Flydubai received explicit instructions, committed to carrying out the required background checks on its crews and announced in writing that it had implemented the national restrictions on flights to Israel in the crew assignment system,” the ministry said.
“The list of crew members for flight FZ1073 was not received by the Transportation Ministry, and the Security Division does not have access to the flight lists,” it added.
The ministry said the incident remains under investigation and that any violation of the security requirements will be addressed.
“The incident is under investigation by security officials,” the ministry said. “To the extent that a deviation from the instructions is found, it will be handled accordingly.”
The explanation, however, has intensified rather than quieted the controversy because internal government documents reportedly show that senior Israeli officials had spent years debating precisely this problem: who was responsible for ensuring that foreign airlines and their personnel did not pose a security threat to Israel.
A 2021 cabinet decision shifted responsibilities away from the Shin Bet and placed responsibility for overseeing certain aspects of foreign-flight security with the Transportation Ministry and the Civil Aviation Authority. The Civil Aviation Authority was tasked with ensuring that security arrangements in foreign countries not classified at the highest risk level complied with international requirements.
By 2023, concerns were already being raised about the ability of the existing system to identify dangerous foreign crew members. A meeting involving the National Security Council, Shin Bet and Mossad reportedly examined the vulnerabilities associated with foreign airline personnel flying into Israel.
The problem was not theoretical. Pilots and crew members holding citizenship from countries without diplomatic relations with Israel — including Iran, Lebanon and Pakistan — had reportedly reached Ben Gurion Airport on foreign carriers in previous years. Omani nationals also entered Israel as airline crew members on numerous occasions.
A confidential State Comptroller report in 2024 reportedly found deficiencies in the government’s handling of foreign-flight security. That same year, the cabinet instructed the National Security Council to establish an interagency team involving the Transportation Ministry, Civil Aviation Authority, Shin Bet, Mossad and Finance Ministry to examine the security structure governing international commercial flights into Israel.
Those discussions exposed a fundamental problem: the Transportation Ministry was being asked to assume responsibility for an area requiring intelligence capabilities that ministry officials said they did not possess.
The Shin Bet reportedly maintained that it lacked the personnel and budget necessary to resume responsibility for screening foreign flights. The National Security Council, meanwhile, concluded that the Transportation Ministry should fulfill its responsibility but acknowledged that the Civil Aviation Authority would require additional manpower and funding to do so effectively.
Inside the Transportation Ministry itself, there was significant opposition. Security officials reportedly warned that the ministry simply lacked the tools necessary to determine whether a seemingly ordinary foreign crew member had a dangerous background in another country.
According to one official familiar with the discussions, “The entire professional team at the Transportation Ministry strongly opposed the transfer of authorities, except for the head of the Civil Aviation Authority, Shmuel Zakai.”
“They all stood up and told Minister Miri Regev that it would be a grave mistake to take on such a huge responsibility.”
Despite those objections, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ultimately determined in 2025 that responsibility for the security framework surrounding foreign flights would remain with the Transportation Ministry.
Even before that final decision, the National Security Council reportedly issued a written warning in March 2025 stating that the Transportation Ministry was not adequately carrying out its role in overseeing the security arrangements for foreign flights.
Particularly troubling is the claim that despite acknowledging that it lacked the intelligence capabilities necessary to independently vet foreigners, the Transportation Ministry did not request assistance from the Shin Bet or Mossad to investigate individual passengers or crew members.
Critics say the intelligence agencies themselves were aware of the gap but did not step in to fill it.
“The Shin Bet and Mossad knew full well that the Transportation Ministry was in pieces, that it had no people, no positions, and no capabilities,” one source familiar with the process said. “How did they just shrug off responsibility like that and dump everything on the Transportation Ministry? The responsibility lies with the Transportation Ministry — but the Shin Bet and Mossad also enabled this failure, and the writing was on the wall.”
The Transportation Ministry has rejected that account as “completely false,” arguing that responsibility for aspects of foreign-flight security has existed within the ministry for decades and was not suddenly transferred to it in recent years.
The ministry has also pointed to two previous committees headed by the National Security Council that recommended establishing a dedicated national aviation-security authority responsible for all flights. The Transportation Ministry says it supported that proposal, but the recommendations were never implemented.
The immediate security question is complicated further by what Israel apparently knew before Flight FZ1073 departed. UAE authorities provided Israel with the flight’s passenger and crew information, but no Israeli authority raised a warning that prevented al-Hammami from taking his seat in the cockpit.
The ministry maintains that it did not receive that information directly. It also says Flydubai itself had assured Israeli authorities that its system incorporated Israel’s nationality restrictions for flight crews.
Those restrictions have become central to the investigation because al-Hammami is reported to be an Omani citizen. Oman does not maintain diplomatic relations with Israel, and his presence aboard repeated flights to Tel Aviv has raised questions about whether existing nationality restrictions were enforced at all.
The case becomes still more serious in light of reports about al-Hammami’s history. He reportedly trained with Oman Air before concerns arose over extremist material and his ideological views. He was removed from flying duties and reassigned to an administrative position before eventually leaving the airline and later joining Flydubai.
Investigators are now examining whether Flydubai adequately checked his previous employment and whether information held in Oman about his alleged radicalization was ever communicated to the airline or to Israeli authorities.
Al-Hammami reportedly flew to Israel numerous times during his months with Flydubai, meaning the September 30 flight was not his first entry into Israeli airspace. Investigators are also examining allegations that he deliberately sought employment with an airline serving Tel Aviv because he had already conceived a terrorist attack against Israel.
The Transportation Ministry acknowledged another uncomfortable reality during a briefing following the attack: it cannot guarantee that the current system will prevent a similar case from occurring again.
“Nothing is 100% when it comes to security,” a ministry representative said.
Ministry officials reportedly argued that the only way to guarantee that no dangerous foreign pilot ever flies into Israel would be to prevent foreign airlines from serving the country altogether — something that would effectively leave international service largely dependent on Israeli carriers.
The ministry’s Security Division has also been operating with limited staffing. Reports indicate that a relatively small number of permanent government employees oversee a broad range of aviation-security responsibilities, with much of the work performed by contractors. Officials have argued that the division was never equipped to function as an intelligence-screening agency for thousands of foreign aviation personnel.
The Shin Bet had itself previously identified vulnerabilities in the arrangement and reportedly recommended transferring broader oversight to a dedicated aviation-security framework. Yet years of committees, cabinet discussions, warnings and disagreements failed to produce such a body before the Flydubai incident.
Prime Minister Netanyahu has now ordered National Security Council Director Shmuel Ben Ezra to appoint an inspector to conduct a comprehensive review of the security arrangements governing foreign civilian flights to Israel. The inquiry is expected to examine the division of responsibility between the Transportation Ministry, Civil Aviation Authority, Shin Bet, Mossad and other agencies, as well as the flow of passenger and crew information before foreign aircraft depart for Israel.
The government has also tightened rules governing foreign crews following the attack, including restrictions intended to prevent citizens or dual citizens of countries without diplomatic relations with Israel from serving aboard Israel-bound flights.
The investigation is therefore no longer focused solely on how one allegedly radicalized pilot reached the cockpit of a Flydubai aircraft. It is examining a security structure in which an airline says it performed the required checks, the Transportation Ministry says it is not an intelligence agency, the intelligence services had previously identified vulnerabilities, government bodies debated responsibility for years, and Israel nevertheless received information about the flight before takeoff without al-Hammami being stopped.
For Israeli investigators, the question is now not simply how al-Hammami slipped through. It is which agency was supposed to make sure that he could not.
{Matzav.com}
