Feed aggregator

The Omani co-pilot accused of launching a jihadist attack aboard an Israel-bound Flydubai flight received professional aviation training in Britain and New Zealand before beginning his commercial flying career, according to a new report revealing additional details about the background of the man who allegedly tried to bring down the passenger jet.

Hamam al-Hammami, 29, is being held in Abu Dhabi following the dramatic Sept. 30 attack aboard Flydubai Flight FZ1073 from Dubai to Tel Aviv. Authorities say Hammami attacked the captain inside the cockpit with a crash axe in what has been described as an attempted terrorist hijacking.

Hammami has reportedly admitted that the attack was motivated by the war in Gaza and that he intended to die during the assault.

“I did it as revenge for Gaza. I wanted to die as a shahid,” al-Hammami told investigators.

New information about Hammami’s background indicates that years before the attack, he received flight training through L3 Airline Academy, then one of Britain’s largest professional pilot-training organizations. He reportedly trained with the academy between 2018 and 2019.

L3 operated several major aviation-training facilities in England, including centers in Southampton and Bournemouth and a simulator facility near Gatwick Airport. The company has since become part of Acron Aviation.

There has been no allegation that L3 Airline Academy, Acron Aviation or any related company had knowledge of extremist views on Hammami’s part or engaged in wrongdoing connected to the attack. Acron has said it is prepared to cooperate with authorities investigating the incident.

Hammami’s training was not limited to Britain. Authorities in New Zealand confirmed that he received a six-month student visa for aviation training there from November 2018 until May 2019 “for a UK-based company no longer operating in New Zealand”.

At the time, L3 operated an international pilot-training program that allowed cadets to divide their studies between Britain and New Zealand. Trainees could complete classroom and theoretical instruction in Southampton before traveling to Hamilton, New Zealand, for practical flight training and then returning to Britain for more advanced instruction.

Hammami subsequently worked for Oman Air, where he remained employed until February 2025. L3 also had ties to the Omani carrier, which had previously included the aviation school among five internationally recognized institutions whose graduates were eligible for consideration in its pilot recruitment program.

Acron Aviation has declined to say publicly whether Hammami was one of its students, citing its policy of not identifying present or past trainees.

“We were saddened to hear of this incident, and our thoughts are with everyone affected. As a matter of policy, we do not publicly comment on whether any individual is or has been a student with us.”

“We will, of course, assist the relevant authorities, if necessary, in any way we can as they investigate this incident.”

Hammami eventually joined Flydubai as a relatively new pilot before being assigned to the carrier’s route to Israel. Reports since the attack have raised questions about his behavior and views before the incident and whether any warning signs were missed before he was permitted to operate flights to Tel Aviv.

The attack unfolded after Flight FZ1073 departed Dubai for Tel Aviv with approximately 160 people aboard. Investigators believe Hammami waited until the aircraft was airborne before attacking the captain inside the cockpit with a crash axe.

Despite suffering serious injuries, the captain managed to resist Hammami and open the cockpit door, allowing others aboard the aircraft to intervene. Hammami was overpowered, and the damaged flight was diverted away from Israel before landing safely in Saudi Arabia.

The episode triggered an extraordinary security response in Israel. With authorities initially uncertain about what was occurring aboard the aircraft or whether the attack was part of a larger terrorist operation, Israeli defense officials prepared for the possibility that the plane itself could be used as a weapon.

Two Israeli officials subsequently said that Israel was prepared to shoot down the Flydubai aircraft if it continued toward Israeli airspace after Hammami attacked the captain. Fighter jets were prepared to intercept the aircraft if necessary as officials monitored its movements.

The United Arab Emirates also provided Israeli authorities with information about the flight crew as officials in both countries worked to establish what had happened and determine whether Hammami had acted alone.

The investigation has since expanded beyond the immediate circumstances aboard the aircraft. Israeli authorities are attempting to determine whether Hammami independently decided to carry out the attack because of the Gaza war or whether another individual, organization or foreign actor played a role in planning or encouraging it.

The Shin Bet is participating in the investigation, a fact that was cleared for publication this week by Israel’s military censor. Israeli investigators are examining Hammami’s background, contacts and activities in an effort to determine whether there was any connection to a terrorist organization or outside handler.

So far, no conclusive evidence has been publicly disclosed establishing that Hammami acted on instructions from another party. His reported statement to investigators points to Gaza as his stated motivation, but Israeli officials have not ruled out other possibilities as the investigation continues.

The attack has also prompted broader scrutiny of airline security procedures involving pilots and other crew members flying to Israel. Reports have revealed that approximately 1,200 crew members from countries whose citizens are generally barred from entering Israel had nevertheless entered the country as airline personnel, raising questions about the security screening applied to foreign flight crews.

Israeli authorities have been reviewing those procedures in the aftermath of the Flydubai attack, including the process by which pilots and crew members assigned to Israel-bound flights are vetted.

The six people credited with helping prevent the attack from ending in catastrophe are also set to receive recognition from Israeli President Isaac Herzog. Their intervention, together with the wounded captain’s actions, prevented Hammami from gaining control of the aircraft and allowed the plane to land safely.

The revelation that Hammami received professional aviation training in Britain and New Zealand now adds another element to the international investigation into his background, as authorities seek to reconstruct the path that took him from flight schools in the West to the cockpit of an Israel-bound passenger jet — and ultimately to an alleged attempt to turn that aircraft into the instrument of a jihadist attack.

{Matzav.com}

President Trump has approved the execution by U.S. Army firing squad of Nidal Malik Hasan, the radicalized Army psychiatrist who murdered 13 people and wounded 32 others in the 2009 Fort Hood massacre, setting the stage for the first U.S. military execution in 65 years and the first Army firing-squad execution since World War II.

Hasan, now 56, is scheduled to be executed on Dec. 3, 2026, at Fort Hood — the same Texas military installation where he carried out his deadly attack nearly 17 years ago — according to an email sent to families of the victims. The execution date was set after President Trump approved the death sentence and the method of execution following a recommendation from Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth.

Chief Pentagon spokesman Sean Parnell announced the decision, describing Hasan as a “convicted terrorist” and “the jihadist who opened fire on unarmed American soldiers at Fort Hood in 2009.”

“He killed 13 people and wounded 32 others while shouting ‘Allahu Akbar’ during the attack,” Parnell said.

“The Secretary of the Army will set the time and place of the execution,” he continued. “Judgement day for Hasan has finally come.”

Hasan was an Army major and psychiatrist when, on Nov. 5, 2009, he entered the Soldier Readiness Processing Center at Fort Hood, where military personnel were preparing for deployments overseas. Armed with a semiautomatic handgun equipped with laser sights, Hasan opened fire on the unarmed people inside.

Witnesses said Hasan shouted “Allahu Akbar” immediately before beginning his rampage. Over the course of approximately 10 minutes, he fired 146 rounds, killing 13 people and wounding 32 others. Twelve of those killed were soldiers, and one of the victims was pregnant.

Among the severely wounded was Staff Sgt. Patrick Zeigler, a two-time combat veteran who was shot four times and spent nearly a year recovering in hospitals.

“He looked me straight in the eyes as he pointed the gun at me, and a split second later, I’m on the floor with a hole in my head,” Zeigler later recalled.

The massacre ended when civilian police officers confronted Hasan. He was shot multiple times and left paralyzed from the waist down.

Investigators subsequently uncovered extensive evidence of Hasan’s radicalization before the attack. He had repeatedly expressed opposition to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and exchanged communications with Anwar al-Awlaki, the American-born Al Qaeda cleric and propagandist who was later killed in a U.S. drone strike in Yemen.

Hasan had himself been scheduled to deploy to Afghanistan later in November 2009. During subsequent court proceedings, he made clear that he viewed his attack through the prism of what he considered a war against Islam.

At one stage, Hasan sought permission to pursue a legal strategy arguing that he had acted in defense of others. When the military judge asked whom he claimed to have been defending, Hasan replied, “The leadership of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the Taliban.”

Hasan ultimately represented himself at his 2013 court-martial. He admitted that he was the gunman, mounted virtually no defense, called no witnesses and offered little resistance to the prosecution’s case. He told the court that he had come to believe he was fighting on the wrong side of a war and had “switched sides.”

A military jury convicted Hasan in August 2013 on 13 counts of premeditated murder and 32 counts of attempted premeditated murder. The panel unanimously sentenced him to death.

Hasan was then transferred to the U.S. Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, where he has remained on military death row as the case proceeded through the lengthy appeals process required in military capital cases.

The Army Court of Criminal Appeals upheld his conviction and death sentence in 2020. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces subsequently affirmed the sentence, and in March 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to review his case, removing another major legal obstacle to carrying out the execution.

Hegseth announced in September 2025 that he was moving to obtain presidential authorization for Hasan’s execution. Because military death sentences cannot be carried out without presidential approval, the case remained pending until Trump gave his authorization.

The decision to use a firing squad adds an extraordinary historical dimension to the case. The United States military has not executed anyone since April 13, 1961, when Army Pvt. John Bennett was hanged at Fort Leavenworth after being convicted of rape and attempted murder of an 11-year-old girl.

The last known U.S. military execution by firing squad occurred during World War II. Pvt. Eddie Slovik was shot by an Army firing squad in France on Jan. 31, 1945, after being convicted of desertion. He was the only American soldier executed for desertion during World War II.

Under current Army regulations, a military execution requires approval from the president. Regulations were revised in 2019 to remove language specifying lethal injection as the required method, leaving greater flexibility over how a military death sentence can be carried out.

Even with Trump’s approval and a Dec. 3 execution date, Hasan could still seek to delay the sentence through litigation in the civilian federal courts, including a petition for habeas corpus. Military death sentences have historically generated years — and sometimes decades — of additional legal proceedings.

Hasan is one of only a handful of prisoners on U.S. military death row. Others include Hasan Akbar, convicted of murdering two fellow soldiers in Kuwait in 2003; Ronald Gray, convicted of multiple murders and rapes; and Timothy Hennis, convicted of murdering a woman and two of her children.

Hasan’s case, however, stands apart because of the scale of the Fort Hood massacre and his own statements concerning his motives. The attack was among the deadliest acts of violence ever carried out on a U.S. military installation.

If the execution proceeds as scheduled on Dec. 3, Hasan will be put to death at the military base where he carried out the massacre — ending a capital case that has stretched from the Fort Hood killings in 2009 through nearly 17 years of court proceedings and appeals.

{Matzav.com}